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ARTICLE

ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE CATHOLIC
UNIVERSITY: AN HISTORICAL REVIEW,
A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS, AND A
PRESCRIPTIVE PROPOSAL
JOHN M. BREEN* & LEE J. STRANG**
INTRODUCTION
Among university professors, researchers, and instructors, academic
freedom is universally acknowledged as a principle that is indispensable to
the academic enterprise. Those involved in higher education often describe
the principle as a “constituent element” of the modern university1—a principle that “distinguishes a university from a propaganda institution or a
center of indoctrination.”2 Supported by a culture of deference to individual
faculty, given juridical form, and accompanied by rights of due process, the
principle of academic freedom is a formidable source of protection for
faculty engaged in both classroom instruction and scholarly research.
But what does this principle mean in the context of an academic institution that itself holds substantive truth commitments with respect to questions that are a source of debate and inquiry within the academic
community? Can a college or university be committed to both academic
freedom, which establishes the procedural ground rules for conducting the
scholarly enterprise, and a set of substantive commitments that the institution believes are grounded in truth? Although the tension between open
inquiry and other truth-laden convictions can be found in any institution
where both kinds of commitments are present, historically, critics have
* Georgia Reithal Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law; B.A. 1985,
University of Notre Dame; J.D. 1988, Harvard University.
** John W. Stoepler Professor of Law & Values, University of Toledo College of Law; B.A.
1997, Loras College; J.D. 2001, University of Iowa; LL.M. 2003, Harvard University.
1. See, e.g., Lonnie D. Kliever, Religion and Academic Freedom: Issues of Faith and Reason, 74 ACADEME 8, 8 (Jan.–Feb. 1988) (“Academic freedom is a constituent element of the very
foundations upon which the modern university rests.”).
2. Charles E. Curran, Academic Freedom: The Catholic University and Catholic Theology,
66 ACADEME 126, 127 (Apr. 1980).
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claimed that the most pressing challenges to academic freedom have resided in religiously-affiliated colleges and universities.
In the Essay that follows, we take up these questions specifically in the
context of a Catholic university. The Essay is composed of four parts. In
Part I, we sketch the origins of the concept of academic freedom in colleges
and universities in the United States. We then examine the contemporary
understanding of the concept as set forth in the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure from the Association of American
Colleges (AAC) and the American Association of University Professors
(AAUP). We also examine several key documents that led up to the 1940
Statement and the official interpretive gloss that the AAUP has put on the
document since it was first issued. Next, we provide a brief history of the
experience of academic freedom in Catholic universities in the United
States. This history includes a series of pivotal controversies in the 1950s1960s at four Catholic universities: the University of Notre Dame, St.
John’s University, the University of Dayton, and the Catholic University of
America. It also includes a brief review of two transformative documents—
the Land O’Lakes Statement (1967) and The Catholic University in the
Modern World (1972)—in which leading Catholic educators endeavored to
articulate a conception of a modern Catholic university that included a robust role for academic freedom. In light of these developments,3 Catholic
universities revised their policies on academic freedom. Here we trace the
development of this policy at one school, Loyola University Chicago, as
representative of what took place at most Catholic institutions of higher
learning.4
In Part II of the Essay, we offer a conceptual critique of academic
freedom as defined in the 1940 Statement. We argue that this widely accepted articulation of the concept is question begging at best, and at worst
internally incoherent. The AAUP definition of academic freedom is question begging because it assumes a particular conception of the university as
normative and then draws its definition of academic freedom from that conception. There are, however, other reasonable conceptions of what constitutes a “university” with their own entailed conceptions of academic
freedom, such that the AAUP’s implicit assumption stands undefended.
Furthermore, the AAUP definition is internally incoherent. The AAUP conception of academic freedom declares that every idea must be subject to
challenge and possible refutation while, at the same time, harboring certain
3. These developments coincided with the reorganization of most Catholic universities
under the governance of lay boards of trustees and the general reception of Vatican II. See JAMES
JEROME CONN, S.J., CATHOLIC UNIVERSITIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND ECCLESIASTICAL AUTHORITY 153–84 (1991).
4. An appendix to the Article provides examples of similar policies at several Catholic universities including Loyola University Chicago, Creighton University, Georgetown University, the
University of Dayton, and the University of Notre Dame.
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ideas as unassailable and immune from criticism. All rational thought, including the 1940 Statement, must proceed by assuming the truth of certain
presuppositions. Yet, without argument, the 1940 Statement singles out religious propositions as uniquely obnoxious to the academic enterprise. In
developing this critique, we draw upon the work of Pope John Paul II, especially his apostolic constitution, Ex Corde Ecclesiae, on the nature of Catholic universities, and his encyclical, Fides et Ratio, on the relationship
between faith and reason. We also examine the strikingly different approach
to academic freedom taken in the founding document of Thomas Aquinas
College, and in the work of philosophers David Schindler and Alvin
Plantinga.
In Part III of the Essay, we argue that the many striking contradictions
between the conception of academic freedom (as articulated in the 1940
Statement and typically defended in academic circles) and the actual practice of academic freedom in American universities (private and public, secular and religious) indicates that few people actually believe in the AAUP
version of the principle. This disconnect also suggests that the 1940 Statement is not so much the articulation of a foundational principle of academic
life as an ideology that serves ends other than those it purports to advance.
Of course, some version of academic freedom is necessary for universities to fulfill their mission as conveyors of knowledge and centers of inquiry. This is no less true of Catholic universities. In Part IV of the Essay,
we offer some practical suggestions for how Catholic universities can remain faithful to the truth professed by the Church, while giving their faculty
members the freedom necessary to raise questions, conduct research, and
participate in the great conversation that is the essence of the scholarly
enterprise.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM
AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES

IN

A. The Emergence of Academic Freedom in the Late-Nineteenth
Century
From the colonial period through the first half of the nineteenth century, college and university professors were regularly selected from the
ranks of clergy who were members of the denomination sponsoring the college.5 Though the questions of academic freedom that arose during this era
of college sectarianism often involved the charge of heresy, “these experiences had not shaped any broad principles to guide the life of the colleges.”6 The old-time college professor typically cared little about
5. See GEORGE M. MARSDEN, THE SOUL OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY: FROM PROTESTANT
ESTABLISHMENT TO ESTABLISHED NONBELIEF 81 (1994).
6. FREDERICK RUDOLPH, THE AMERICAN COLLEGE & UNIVERSITY: A HISTORY 410–11
(1962).
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publishing the latest tract on the new topic in his discipline—assuming he
saw himself as a member of a discrete academic discipline, which would
have been unusual. Rather, his position was to share what he knew and to
serve as a role model embodying the Christian wisdom and virtues of the
college’s sponsoring religious community.
Following the German university model, major American universities
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were reconfigured as
research institutions. No longer content with merely conveying knowledge
from one generation to the next, the modern university was now dedicated
to the discovery of new knowledge. Thus, the new academic man was identified by “[i]ntellect rather than piety”7 and marked by his productivity in
scholarly publication rather than his proficiency in the classroom. American
academics borrowed two concepts from their German counterparts: Lernfreiheit—the freedom of students to study and take the courses of one’s
choice—and Lehrfreiheit—the right of the professor to freedom in his
teaching, as well as the right to freedom of inquiry, and to share the results
of his research with others.8
Both of these concepts related to the experience of students and teachers within the university community itself. American academics supplemented these freedoms by adding the sacrosanct value of free speech to the
activities of professors outside the classroom. This was important because
“in seeking to apply their economic and political and social discoveries to
the real world, [they] often collided with the men who were serving the
universities as benefactors and trustees.”9 To speak out in favor of labor
unions and against railroads and monopolies, for instance, sometimes led to
dismissal.10
Out of these sorts of cases of faculty discipline and dismissal, a clearer
and stronger sense of the principle of academic freedom emerged. Combined with a tenure system, which ensured job security and supplied a structure of rank and seniority and salary schedules, American academics
developed into a professional class.11
The influence of the German research university model complimented
a more home-grown reason for academic freedom. As George Marsden explains, “America’s pace-setting universities were products of liberal Protestant culture.”12 The first generation of American research university7. Id. at 410.
8. Id. at 412.
9. Id. at 413–14.
10. See MARSDEN, supra note 5, at 300 (“[B]ig business would now be seen as the primary
threat to free expression.”).
11. Cf. RUDOLPH, supra note 6, at 415–16.
12. GEORGE M. MARSDEN, THE OUTRAGEOUS IDEA OF CHRISTIAN SCHOLARSHIP 14 (1997).
Marsden explains that the culture was “Protestant” in that Protestantism was the historically dominant religion, and “liberal” in that “it emphasized the unifying moral dimensions of its spiritual
heritage, rather than the particulars of traditional Protestant doctrine.” Id.
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builders were New Englanders who saw freedom as the touchstone of
American civilization and who “saw themselves as standing for individual
freedom and freedom of inquiry” and against authoritarianism. They saw
freedom as “an outgrowth of the best in the Protestant tradition,”13 whereas
authoritarianism was seen as Roman Catholic in origin and practice. Scientific research and inquiry in the university “would have to be free from
appeals to supernaturally based authority”14 and so defined in purely naturalistic terms. But this naturalistic inquiry “could be supplemented by humanistic moral ideals that also emphasized freedom and that would advance
Christian and democratic society.”15
Prior to the development of academic freedom as a feature of university life, “[a] teacher held his post at the president’s pleasure, or that of his
board.”16 Christopher Lucas contends that when a teacher was fired for
voicing his viewpoint, “it was usually a matter of his having taken a stand
contrary to prevailing religious orthodoxy.”17 The examples he cites, however, deal with the expression of political and economic opinions. The most
famous of these took place in 1900. Jane Lathrop Stanford, co-founder
(with her late husband) of the university named for her late son, instructed
president David Starr Jordan to fire Edward Ross, an economics and sociology professor at the school. Ross had spoken out in favor of the Democratic
Party’s “Free Silver” policy and against corporate monopolies and the importation of cheap Oriental labor—“coolie” workers—on both economic
and racial grounds. Mrs. Stanford objected to Ross’ use of the University’s
name in support of partisan ends, as well as the substance of his opinions.
Jordan reluctantly requested Ross’ resignation, and a number of Stanford
faculty members resigned in protest.18 “For faculty defenders of academic
freedom, issues of high principle were at stake,” but to university administrators, it was a matter of “public relations.”19 This left the outspoken academic in a rather precarious position since many college and university
trustees viewed any given professor as “an employee of the institution, no
more, no less” such that “[i]f his conduct was displeasing to management,
officials were entitled to give him his walking papers as readily as business
executives might fire a factory hireling.”20
13. Id. at 14.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 15.
16. CHRISTOPHER J. LUCAS, AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION: A HISTORY 202 (2d ed. 2006).
17. Id.
18. Brian Eule, Watch Your Words, Professor, STAN. MAG. (Jan.–Feb., 2015), https://
medium.com/@stanfordmag/watch-your-words-professor-1b1c03bd91e0.
19. LUCAS, supra note 16, at 205.
20. Id. See also RUDOLPH, supra note 6, at 414 (citing several examples, in addition to Ross
at Stanford, in which faculty members were dismissed, not for their religious unorthodoxy, but
because their political and economic views were at odds with those of university trustees and
benefactors).
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B. AAUP Statements
1. The 1915 Declaration
The firing of Edward Ross at Stanford directly gave rise to the contemporary articulation of academic freedom and the institutional forms it assumed. In 1915, a group of professors (including philosopher Arthur
Lovejoy who left Stanford in the wake of the Ross affair) established the
American Association of University Professors. The AAUP organized a
committee to address the problem of academic freedom and shortly thereafter adopted a Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure (the 1915 Declaration).21 Referring to Lehrfreiheit, the
document defined academic freedom as “freedom of inquiry and research,”
“freedom of teaching,” and “freedom of extramural utterance and action.”22
The 1915 Declaration rejects the claim that the relationship between
the university trustees and the faculty member is “analogous to that that of a
private employer and his employees.”23 Instead, it proposes that “the relationship of professor to trustees may be compared to that between judges of
the federal courts and the executive who appoints them.”24 Professors may
speak freely of their own accord on matters of interest to them and to the
public, even if what they say does not find a welcome audience among the
school’s administrators. In this way, teachers at universities and colleges
can contribute to public deliberation, offering their counsels as “the disinterested expression of the scientific temper and of unbiased inquiry.”25
The 1915 Declaration draws a rather stark demarcation between those
institutions that enjoy “complete and unlimited freedom to pursue inquiry
and publish its results” and all others. The document repeatedly refers to
academic freedom in absolutist terms: “It is obvious that here again the
scholar must be absolutely free not only to pursue his investigations but to
declare the results of his researches, no matter where they may lead him or
to what extent they may come into conflict with accepted opinion”26; “The
responsibility of the university as a whole is to the community at large, and
any restriction upon the freedom of the instructor is bound to react injuriously upon the efficiency and the morale of the institution.”27
As examples of schools that do not enjoy the full measure of academic
freedom, the 1915 Declaration pointed to “a proprietary school or college
designed for the propagation of specific doctrines prescribed by those who
21. Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, 1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom
and Academic Tenure, 1 BULL. 17 (Dec. 1915), reprinted in AM. ASS’N OF U. PROFESSORS, POLICY
DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS, app. at 291 (10th ed. 2006) [hereinafter 1915 Declaration].
22. Id. at 292.
23. Id. at 293.
24. Id. at 295.
25. Id. at 297-98.
26. Id. at 296.
27. 1915 Declaration, supra note 21, at 296.
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have furnished its endowment.” The document identifies religiously affiliated schools as akin to these institutions:
If a church or religious denomination establishes a college to be
governed by a board of trustees with the express understanding
that the college will be used as an instrument of propaganda in the
interests of the religious faith professed by the church or denomination creating it, the trustees have the right to demand that everything be subordinated to that end.28
However, such an institution does not “accept the principles of freedom of
inquiry, of opinion, and of teaching, and their purpose is not to advance
knowledge by unrestricted research.”29 Such an institution “should not be
permitted to sail under false colors”30 promoting itself as a genuine university. Indeed, “any university which lays restrictions upon the intellectual
freedom of its professors proclaims itself a proprietary institution, and
should be so described whenever it makes a general appeal for funds.”31
2. The 1940 Statement
Following a series of joint conferences in 1940, the Association of
American Colleges32 and the AAUP agreed upon a new document restating
the principles of academic freedom and their relation to faculty tenure. This
document, known as the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure,33 has been endorsed by numerous professional and academic organizations, and incorporated into the policies of hundreds of
American colleges and universities. Consequently, in the American context,
the 1940 Statement is the focal point of discussions concerning academic
freedom today.
The 1940 Statement provides that the purpose of the document is “to
promote public understanding and support of academic freedom and tenure.” Thus, the document not only proposes a regulatory standard, it is, selfconsciously, an advocacy document designed to persuade its audience of
the merits of the principle of academic freedom.
The 1940 Statement argues that colleges and universities are conducted
to advance the common good, and that “[t]he common good depends upon
the free search for truth and its free exposition.”34 The 1940 Statement ap28. Id. at 293.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. The Association of American Colleges is now the Association of American Colleges &
Universities (AAC&U).
33. Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and
Tenure with 1970 Interpretive Comments, 56 AAUP BULL. 323 (1970), reprinted in AM. ASS’N OF
U. PROFESSORS, POLICY DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS 13 (11th ed. 2014) [hereinafter 1940
Statement].
34. Id. at 14.
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plies this rationale to faculty speech in the contexts of research and scholarship, teaching, and citizenship. Because “[f]reedom in research is
fundamental to the advancement of truth,” the 1940 Statement posits that
“[t]eachers are entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication of
the results, subject to the adequate performance of their other academic duties.”35 Because academic freedom “is fundamental for the protection of the
rights of the teacher in teaching,” the 1940 Statement posits that “[t]eachers
are entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing their subject,” though
they “should be careful not to introduce into their teaching controversial
matter which has no relation to their subject.”36 Moreover, when teachers
“speak or write as citizens, they should be free from institutional censorship
or discipline” while bearing the responsibility to make clear that they “are
not speaking for the institution.”37
The 1940 Statement also sets forth academic tenure as a practical
mechanism to ensure that a teacher’s right of academic freedom—in research, in classroom teaching, and as a citizen—is guaranteed. Under the
system of tenure, a teacher enjoys continuous employment and may be terminated “only for adequate cause, except in the case of retirement for age,
or under extraordinary circumstances because of financial exigencies.”38
Unlike the 1915 Statement’s claim that a religiously affiliated institution cannot in principle possess academic freedom, the 1940 Statement sets
forth only one significant caveat concerning academic freedom for religiously affiliated schools: the Limitations Clause. This portion of the 1940
Statement provides that “[l]imitations of academic freedom because of religious or other aims of the institution should be clearly stated in writing at
the time of appointment.”39 This language explicitly anticipates that academic freedom may be different at religious schools. As such, it assumes
that academic freedom may exist at religiously affiliated universities, and it
implies that such a limitation may be legitimate. It does not say that an
institution that employs what the 1940 Statement plainly allows is less of a
university or not genuinely committed to the academic enterprise. Rather,
all that is required for such a limitation to be effective is that notice be
given at the time of appointment.

35. Id.
36. A notorious example of a professor speaking out on an issue outside his field of study is
Arthur Butz, a longtime professor of electrical engineering at Northwestern University who is a
Holocaust denier. See ARTHUR R. BUTZ, THE HOAX OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE CASE
AGAINST THE PRESUMED EXTERMINATION OF EUROPEAN JEWRY (4th ed. 2015).
37. 1940 Statement, supra note 33, at 14.
38. Id. at 15.
39. Id. at 14.
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3. The 1967 Special Committee Report
In 1967, the AAUP appointed a Special Committee on Academic Freedom in Church-Related Institutions “to study and make more explicit the
meaning of the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and
Tenure vis-à-vis church-related institutions.”40
The committee’s report recognized the value of the Limitations Clause
in the 1940 Statement. At the same time, it cautioned that, “[w]hile this
general position accommodates the church-related institutions, its application can constitute a threat to free inquiry and expression.”41 The report
recommended that institutions employ the Limitations Clause sparingly,
that a college or university limit academic freedom only where it is “essential to the religious aims of the institution,” and that any limitation “should
be clearly stated in writing with reasonable particularity and made a matter
of public knowledge.”42
Overall, the report represented a begrudging acknowledgment of the
Limitations Clause. It reflected the desire of AAUP to do away with the
Limitations Clause but also recognized that it would not be politically feasible to seek to amend the 1940 Statement to eliminate the Clause. Thus, the
next best strategy was to attempt to limit its scope and discourage its application as much as possible.
4. The 1970 Interpretive Comments to the 1940 Statement
In 1970, the AAUP and the AAC appended a set of “Interpretive Comments” to the 1940 Statement.43 They did not amend the document itself.
Although the actual text of the 1940 Statement remained unchanged, including the Limitations Clause, the comment drafters sought to alter the text’s
meaning by claiming that it is a living document that “has evolved through
a variety of processes,” and that the incorporation of the comments “is
based on the premise that the 1940 ‘Statement’ is not a static code but a
fundamental document designed to set a framework of norms to guide adaptations to changing times and circumstances.”44 According to the drafters,
the comments represented their attempt “to formulate the most important of
these refinements.”45
The 1970 comment that addresses the Limitations Clause provides:
“Most church-related institutions no longer need or desire the departure
from the principle of academic freedom implied in the 1940 ‘Statement,’
40. W.J. Kilgore, Report of the Special Committee on Academic Freedom in Church-Related
Colleges and Universities, 53 AAUP BULL. 369, 369 (1967).
41. Tom J. Truss, Jr., et al., Statement on Academic Freedom in Church-Related Colleges
and Universities, in 53 AAUP BULL., supra note 40, at 370.
42. Kilgore, supra note 40, at 370.
43. 1940 Statement, supra note 33, at 13–16 nn.1–11.
44. Id. at 13–14 n.1.
45. Id.
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and we do not now endorse such a departure.”46 This sentence sought to
modify the meaning and import of the 1940 Statement without actually
changing the text itself.
In 1988, the AAUP again explored the possibility of disavowing the
Limitations Clause.47 Although this position was not formally adopted by
the AAUP and the Limitations Clause remains a part the 1940 Statement,
narrowing or eliminating the Clause appears to be the goal of enough university educators and administrators to repeatedly prompt a re-evaluation of
its presence in the text.
C. The Movement of Catholic Higher Education Toward the AAUP’s
Conception of Academic Freedom
1. Initial, Inchoate, Conceptions of Academic Freedom in Catholic
Higher Education
At their founding, Catholic universities generally maintained modest
conceptions of academic freedom. Few if any universities employed written
policies or statements on the topic until the mid-twentieth century. Instead,
university practices reflected an inchoate conception of academic freedom
which, in turn, reflected a consensus perspective of faculty and
administrators.
Catholic universities employed this inchoate, practical conception of
academic freedom for at least three reasons. First, and most importantly, the
intellectual architecture of Catholic education during this period was NeoScholasticism—a revival of the philosophical and theological thought of St.
Thomas Aquinas combined with an effort to see its relevance in the modern
university across all disciplines.48 This perspective aspired to be all-encompassing, and within its purview Catholic faculty robustly pursued inquiry.
But its boundaries were policed so that scholars were limited in their capacity to challenge or work outside of it.
Second, most Catholic universities maintained the pedagogical goals
of providing religious instruction and character formation in educating their
students, instead of primarily serving as centers for the production and
transmission of knowledge. Thus, the curricula, teaching, and hiring practices at these schools focused on forming young people in the tried-and-true
46. Id. at 14 n.5.
47. Matthew W. Finkin, et al., The “Limitations” Clause in the 1940 Statement of Principles,
ACADEME 52, 52–57 (Sept.–Oct. 1988).
48. See PHILIP GLEASON, CONTENDING WITH MODERNITY: CATHOLIC HIGHER EDUCATION IN
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 119 (1995) (describing the Catholic perspective in the first half of the
twentieth century wherein Neo-Scholasticism was thought to “constitute[ ] the most appropriate
cognitive foundation for the culture of a whole society”). Although Aquinas lived in the thirteenth
century, the proponents of Neo-Scholasticism insisted that “Thomism is not a museum piece” but
“is relevant to every epoch.” JACQUES MARITAIN, A PREFACE TO METAPHYSICS 9 (1962). For a
general account of the revival, see GERALD A. MCCOOL, THE NEO-THOMISTS (1994).
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ways of the Church’s tradition. Faculty did not need unfettered freedom to
successfully pursue this mission.
Third, most Catholic universities were controlled by the religious orders that created them. The governing boards of these institutions ensured
that the universities under their charge continued to serve the goals of the
founders.
As we describe below, beginning in the middle of the twentieth century, a series of pivotal controversies at four major Catholic universities
catalyzed a new conception of academic freedom in American Catholic universities. This new conception soon became normative in Catholic higher
education during the late-1960s and early-1970s. These disputes, which
took place at the University of Notre Dame, St. John’s University, the University of Dayton, and the Catholic University of America, were publicly
portrayed and widely-understood as pitting “American-style” academic
freedom against “un-American” religious-hierarchical authority.
2. Four Historical Controversies that Precipitated a New
Conception of Academic Freedom at American Catholic
Universities
The four episodes recounted below, involving academic freedom and
faculty governance by teachers at Catholic universities in the 1950s and
1960s, help explain why the vision of institutional autonomy and academic
freedom articulated contemporaneously in two landmark statements on
Catholic higher education––the Land O’Lakes Statement and The Catholic
University in the Modern World49––proved to be so compelling. Following
these incidents, the debate over academic freedom was framed in such a
way that it became nearly impossible to think of a robust Catholic intellectual identity as compatible with the intellectual life of a modern university.
A Catholic presence that went beyond the ceremonial and ornamental was
regarded as unavoidably repressive. Under these circumstances, the abandonment of the traditional Catholic approach to academic freedom and the
adoption of the AAUP view was perhaps inevitable.
Prior to these incidents, Catholic institutions and their faculties sincerely believed that they enjoyed the freedom to ask questions, conduct
research, and publish the results obtained.50 They also shared the belief that
their academic freedom was to be exercised within the religious commitments of the institution.51 They did not understand themselves as scholars
49. Both statements are discussed in the following section. See infra Section I.C.3.
50. Although it was not a controversy of the same magnitude, the question of academic
freedom in Catholic institutions did arise prior to the four incidents recounted above. See, e.g.,
John Tracy Ellis, A Tradition of Autonomy?, in THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY: A MODERN APPRAISAL 206, 206–70 (Neil G. McCluskey, S.J. ed., 1970).
51. GLEASON, supra note 48, at 309 (noting that the National Catholic Education Association
did not flatly endorse academic freedom on Catholic campuses until 1965, and that prior to this
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who were bound by arbitrary restrictions, but as Catholic scholars who operated within a framework of beliefs that they held to be true in communion
with the Church. To proceed in the examination of some subject based on
premises that one holds to be true is, of course, the method whereby all
scholarly inquiry proceeds.52
As historian Edward Power notes, Catholic colleges had for many
years “proudly proclaimed the existence of full academic freedom in their
institutions,” sometimes even insisting “that only in a Catholic college was
academic freedom possible.”53 However, according to Power, this view
from the inside did not so much reflect a faithful adherence to the principle
of academic freedom as it did reflect the religious make-up of faculties at
Catholic colleges. The teachers at these institutions had, he said, “been
carefully selected on the basis of religious orthodoxy and it was impossible
to imagine them ever thinking about or actually teaching anything in conflict with the official policies of the college or the established doctrines of
the Church.”54 Moreover, the endorsement of academic freedom in the
faculty handbooks and formal policies at these schools were explicitly qualified: “professors were free to teach truth, to pursue it wherever it might
lead, as long as they did so responsibly and as long as they refrained from
teaching or writing anything either remotely or explicitly contrary to the
doctrines of the Catholic Church.”55 In such an environment, “nothing of
consequence pertaining to academic freedom could ever have been
tested.”56 The challenge of academic freedom only arose when faculties at
Catholic institutions became more diverse, and the innovations of Vatican II
popularized new understandings of Catholic identity, individual freedom,
and conscience.
a. The University of Notre Dame
In the 1950s, Rev. Theodore M. Hesburgh, C.S.C., president of the
University of Notre Dame, experienced a challenge to university autonomy
and academic freedom that profoundly informed his views. Because of Father Hesburgh’s leadership among Catholic educators, in time these views
and the incident at St. John’s described in the text, “the few treatments on the subject produced by
Catholics emphasized the limitations on academic freedom imposed by their religious
commitments”).
52. According to historian Edward Power, prior to the 1960s faculties at Catholic colleges
believed in their faithful adherence to academic freedom. EDWARD J. POWER, CATHOLIC HIGHER
EDUCATION IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 420 (1972). By contrast, Charles Curran claims that during
this time, Catholics were in “general agreement that full academic freedom could not exist in
Catholic institutions.” Curran, supra note 2, at 128. Indeed, Curran claims that “[t]he incompatibility between Catholic colleges and full academic freedom was accepted as a matter of course.”
Id. at 129.
53. POWER, supra note 52, at 420.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 421.
56. Id. at 420.

\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\15-2\UST201.txt

2019]

unknown

Seq: 13

11-APR-19

ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY

14:19

265

came to change the nature of Catholic higher education in the United States.
An account of the incident appears in Hesburgh’s autobiography, God,
Country, Notre Dame.57
In 1954, just two years after Hesburgh became president, the Superior
General of the Congregation of the Holy Cross, Rev. Christopher O’Toole,
C.S.C., instructed Hesburgh not to publish a collection of papers that had
been presented at a conference at Notre Dame. The book was entitled The
Catholic Church and World Affairs.58 It contained a paper by Rev. John
Courtney Murray, S.J., commenting on church-state relations that Alfredo
Cardinal Ottaviani, prefect of the Holy Office, wished to suppress. Hesburgh refused to comply, offering instead his resignation. He feared that if
he followed Ottaviani’s order, “Notre Dame would lose all its credibility in
the United States, and so would I, if an official in Rome could abrogate our
academic freedom with the snap of his fingers.”59
A compromise of sorts was worked out whereby Notre Dame sold the
copies of the book already in print and the University did not run a second
printing.60 Father Hesburgh did not resign and, as he notes, Fr. Murray’s
views on church-state relations were “fully vindicated several years later at
Vatican Council II.”61 Yet the incident left a lasting impression that led
Hesburgh to insist on institutional autonomy from church authorities when
he led the preparation of the Land O’Lakes Statement.62
b. St. John’s University
The incident at St. John’s University in New York was less a matter of
academic freedom in the sense of Lehrfreiheit63 and more a matter of the
denial of due process and the absence of faculty governance. Still, the St.
John’s affair was significant because it “demonstrated the power of a
faculty to modify or to halt the operation of a huge college”64 and “the
57. THEODORE M. HESBURGH, GOD, COUNTRY, NOTRE DAME: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THEM. HESBURGH 223–27 (1999).
58. THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN WORLD AFFAIRS (Waldemar Gurian & M.A. Fitzsimmons
eds., 1954).
59. HESBURGH, supra note 57, at 225.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 226.
62. Hesburgh was also influenced by another incident involving academic freedom, or more
specifically, the right of faculty members at Catholic universities to engage publicly as citizens,
making their views known on current issues of the day. The incident involved a group of faculty
members who publicly supported Adlai E. Stevenson in the 1952 presidential election against
Dwight D. Eisenhower. Their letter of support brought embarrassment to the University and complaints from the Eisenhower campaign when the support for Stevenson was incorrectly attributed
to the University. See Philip Gleason, A Question of Academic Freedom, NOTRE DAME MAG.
(Spring 2013), https://magazine.nd.edu/news/a-question-of-academic-freedom/.
63. As noted above, Lehrfreiheit refers to the freedom to conduct one’s classes and to publish
the results of one’s research. See supra notes 7–20 and accompanying text.
64. POWER, supra note 52, at 466.
ODORE
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futility of depending too heavily on authority to impose order on an academic community.”65
Like most Catholic colleges at the time, St. John’s66 underwent enormous growth in the post-war years. In 1955, St. John’s had a faculty of 252
and an enrollment of 7,616 students. By 1965, the University had approximately doubled in size, boasting a faculty of 659 and an enrollment of
13,125 students.67
St. John’s had grown from a small college to a complex institution, yet
many faculty were frustrated that, instead of making changes in governance
and administration to meet this new reality, the University “was still being
run in highly paternalistic fashion by its Vincentian administrators.”68
Chapters of the AAUP and the United Federation of College Teachers
(UFCT) worked to organize the campus to give voice to these concerns,69
and the University took steps toward reform. In response to a faculty walk
out in the spring of 1965, the Board of Trustees reconstituted themselves,
increased faculty salaries and benefits, instituted a democratically elected
Faculty Planning Council, and put in place a new University president and
administration.70 Nevertheless, the administration did not enact the proposed reforms “with the alacrity desired by faculty members.”71 “Impatient
for reforms, 18 philosophy professors—with the intent of embarrassing the
university—ran an ad in the New York Times saying that they were seeking
new jobs.”72
In response to these actions, which it viewed as detrimental to the University, in December, 1965, the St. John’s administration dismissed thirtyone faculty members, both lay and clerical, twenty-three of whom were
immediately suspended from all classroom duties and not allowed to complete their fall classes.73 This amounted to “a colossal breach of academic
65. Id. at 467.
66. St. John’s University is an institution sponsored by the order founded by St. Vincent
DePaul, the Congregation of the Mission. They are more popularly known as the Vincentians.
67. ANTHONY J. DOSEN, CATHOLIC HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE 1960S: ISSUES OF IDENTITY,
ISSUES OF GOVERNANCE 164 (2009).
68. GLEASON, supra note 48, at 309. See also DOSEN, supra note 67, at 165 (noting that Rev.
John Flynn, C.M., who retired as St. John’s president in 1961, was able through his personal
commitment and concern “to shepherd the institution through a period of massive growth” but that
“his autocratic and patriarchal style of leadership did not allow for the serious dialogue that was
the sine qua non of democratic administration of higher education.”); POWER, supra note 52, at
467 (stating that the St. John’s saga helped advance Catholic higher education by “harking back to
threadbare authoritarianism”).
69. GLEASON, supra note 48, at 309.
70. ALICE GALLIN, NEGOTIATING IDENTITY: CATHOLIC HIGHER EDUCATION SINCE 1960,
60–63; John A. Christie, Willard H. Pedrick & John T. Noonan, Jr., Academic Freedom and
Tenure: St. John’s University (N.Y.), 52 AAUP BULL. 12 (Mar. 1966). See also Francis Canavan,
St. John’s University: The Issues, 114 AM. MAG. 122–24 (Jan. 22, 1966); John Leo, Strike at St.
John’s, 83 COMMONWEAL 500 (Jan. 28, 1966).
71. Christie, Pedrick & Noonan, Jr., supra note 70, at 13.
72. Universities: Strife at St. John’s, TIME, Dec. 31, 1965, at 35.
73. Id.
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due process”74 because none of the affected faculty were provided a hearing
or even a reason for the termination.75 “The administration made a fatal
mistake in dismissing several professors whom it considered to be ringleaders in the insurrection.”76 To complete the courses that no longer had instructors and to fill the need in the upcoming spring semester, the
University brought in non-university teachers from the Vincentian order
thereby “revealing their lack of loyalty to academic standards by using persons to conduct university classes who had none of the credentials of the
academic guild.”77 In response, the AAUP and UFCT called a faculty
strike. Although the University remained open during this time, the striking
faculty rallied student support and made good use of the media “to focus
attention on the competence of the administration at St. John’s and to call
into question its competence as an educational institution.”78
The AAUP committee investigating these events concluded that, by
summarily firing faculty members, the University violated its own statutes
and the 1940 Statement, which the Board of Trustees had in principle
agreed to adopt.79 By excluding instructors from the classroom “without
demonstrated reason,” St. John’s had “injured its faculty” and had “destroy[ed] the academic character of the University.”80 Moreover, to have
done so “without granting the faculty members an opportunity to be heard
[was] a grievous and inexcusable violation of academic freedom.”81
The dispute was not simply a matter of faculty salary, benefits, and
governance. It also involved the institution’s religious character: “Some
faculty members made no secret of their conviction that Vincentian control
of the university was the basic problem.”82 Rosemary Lauer, a philosophy
professor, claimed that the Catholic Church should get out of the business
of higher education “because churches and universities don’t mix.”83 Although she made the comment after she was dismissed, others had voiced
the same viewpoint disparaging Catholic sponsorship of universities and
colleges prior to the dismissal.84 The University saw in this attitude the
danger of wholesale secularization. The University contended “that the aca74. GLEASON, supra note 48, at 308.
75. Christie, Pedrick & Noonan, supra note 70, at 13.
76. POWER, supra note 52, at 467.
77. Id.
78. DOSEN, supra note 67, at 183; see also POWER, supra note 52, at 466.
79. Christie, Pedrick & Noonan, supra note 70, at 17–18.
80. Id. at 18–19.
81. Id. at 19.
82. GLEASON, supra note 48, at 310.
83. Id.; see also Francis Canavan, Academic Revolution at St. John’s, 113 AM. MAG. 136
(Aug. 7, 1965) (setting forth similar comments against St. John’s religious character).
84. Canavan, supra note 70, at 124 (quoting Rosemary Lauer that the Catholic Church
“ought not to operate a university” and remarking: “If academic freedom means that the only kind
of university that has a right to exist is a liberal, nonsectarian one, then we are going to have some
very bitter disputes in the American Catholic Church over academic freedom.”).
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demic welfare and even the continuance of St. John’s as a Catholic institution was threatened and could only be saved” by the dismissals.85
Eventually, St. John’s submitted the cases of faculty dismissal to arbitration. The faculty senate soon proposed a statement on academic freedom,
and in 1968 the Board of Trustees formally endorsed the 1940 Statement.86
Thus, the resolution of the conflict at St. John’s witnessed a shift in the
balance of power between faculty and administrators and a realignment of
Catholic identity that influenced events in American Catholic higher education in the years to come. This influence included the transfer of control of
Catholic institutions to lay boards of trustees, the adoption of a nearly unqualified principle of academic freedom, and the declaration of independence from ecclesial authority.
c. The University of Dayton
The dispute over academic freedom that arose at the University of
Dayton was unlike the other affairs recounted above because it involved a
charge of heresy. In the early 1960s, the philosophy department at Dayton
began to diversify its faculty, hiring two new professors who were not
Thomists.
Neo-Thomism was a revival in the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas that
began in the mid-nineteenth century at the Roman universities.87 It burgeoned into a comprehensive movement such that, by the mid-twentieth
century, Neo-Thomism was the defining intellectual feature of Catholic colleges and universities around the world. While it affected every discipline,
Thomism’s dominance was especially pronounced in philosophy and
theology.
In 1966 Dennis Bonnette, a Thomist and an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Dayton, wrote to the Archbishop of Cincinnati,
Karl J. Alter, stating that his colleague, Eulalio R. Baltazar “was subverting
Church doctrine.”88 Receiving no reply, Bonnette persisted, writing to the
University of Dayton Academic Council, and to Alter again, along with a
copy to Archbishop Egidio Vagnozzi, the Apostolic Delegate in Washington, D.C.89 Bonnette accused Baltazar of defending “philosophical plural85. Christie, Pedrick & Noonan, supra note 70, at 14, 15 (quoting the University’s “Summary of Points for Consideration by the Committee of the American Association of University
Professors Visiting St. John’s University, January 28, 29, 30, 1966.”).
86. DOSEN, supra note 67, at 186–87.
87. See MCCOOL, supra note 48.
88. Erving E. Beauregard, An Archbishop, a University, and Academic Freedom, 93 REC.
AM. CATH. HIST. SOC’Y PHILADELPHIA 25 (Mar.–Dec. 1982).
89. Id. at 25–26; Mary J. Brown, An “Inevitable” Campus Controversy”: The “Heresy Affair” at the University of Dayton, 1960–1967, 113 AM. CATH. STUD. 79, 82 (Spring–Summer
2002).
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ism,”90 questioning the infallibility of the Church, defending birth control
and situation ethics, and denying the dogma of purgatory.91 He leveled similar charges against three other teachers, John M. Chrisman, Randolph F.
Lumpp, and Lawrence P. Ulrich. After receiving responses from each of the
accused, Dayton’s president, Rev. Raymond A. Roesch, S.M., concluded
that the four named faculty members were “innocent of the charge of teaching and advocating doctrines contrary to the magisterium of the Church.”92
Still, he appointed an ad hoc faculty committee to clarify “the role of a
Catholic University and the responsibility of a Catholic scholar in the academic world.”93
Faculty and student groups both for and against the accused professors
organized and issued competing recriminations and demands. In response to
the University’s finding of innocence, nine faculty members issued a “Declaration of Conscience on the Doctrinal Crisis at the University of Dayton.”
Characterizing the University’s actions as a “whitewash,” the document’s
nine signatories accused University officials as “exhibit[ing] no sincere religious concern for the spiritual welfare of the students.”94
Now perceiving the matter to be of greater importance than first
imagined, Archbishop Alter convoked a fact-finding commission to investigate the situation.95 President Roesch defended the authority of the Archbishop both to investigate the University and to forbid any individual from
teaching heresy at a Catholic institution. By contrast, the Dayton Chapter of
the AAUP saw the mere existence of the Archdiocesan Commission as “a
flagrant breach of academic freedom.”96 The AAUP at Dayton also complained that the lack of notice and due process at the University was less
protective of the accused than “the rules of the thirteenth century inquisition.”97 It concluded that Catholic universities would not survive if their

90. Alice Gallin, O.S.U., attributes the controversy at Dayton to “the shift away from Thomism as an ‘official’ philosophical system” within the Church. GALLIN, supra note 70, at 66. The
dispute, however, was about more than the introduction of philosophical pluralism to Dayton.
Plainly, Baltazar and the other three faculty members whom Bonnette accused rejected Thomism
and championed the use of other philosophical methods. See Brown, supra note 89, at 81 (quoting
Baltazar’s lecture that Thomism was “irreconcilably out of step with the times.”). Not only was
Bonnette concerned about the faculty members’ use of other philosophical methods, he also complained that they contradicted Church teaching on matters of substance such as the morality of
abortion and contraception, and the reality of purgatory and Church infallibility. Id. at 83–84.
91. Beauregard, supra note 88, at 26.
92. Id. at 27; see also Brown, supra note 89, at 88.
93. Beauregard, supra note 88, at 28.
94. Brown, supra note 89, at 88–89.
95. Id. at 90–91.
96. Beauregard, supra note 88, at 30–32.
97. Id. at 32.
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scholars were subject to the same pressures brought to bear on faculty
members at Dayton.98
The Archdiocesan Commission concluded its investigation but did not
make its report public. It did, however, release a three-page summary which
concluded that there had been “on some occasions teaching contrary to
Catholic faith and morals, which teachings may not have been contrary to
defined doctrines but which were opposed to the teaching of the
[m]agisterium.”99 In reporting the Commission’s findings to the public,
however, Rev. James M. Darby, S.M. (Provincial for the Cincinnati Province of the Society of Mary and Chairman of the University’s Board of
Trustees) insisted that it had “reinforce[d] the decision of the University in
so far as it clears the accused professors of any charge of heresy.”100
Following these competing portrayals of the Archdiocesan Committee’s conclusions, Father Roesch addressed the entire University on March
1, 1967, in which he affirmed Archbishop Alter’s “pastoral concern for the
spiritual welfare of the members of the Archdiocese.”101 Roesch also “made
clear the position that on the University of Dayton campus there must flourish genuine academic freedom,”102 a statement that the local press interpreted as a “declaration of independence” from the Church, and which
others saw as a step toward Dayton becoming a “real” university.103
In July 1967, the ad hoc faculty committee appointed by Roesch issued
its report in which it affirmed the principle of institutional autonomy. The
report declared that a Catholic university “cannot accept any direct relationship to the Magisterium in academic matters; only its Catholic members as
individuals are related to magisterial authority.”104 Indeed, a Catholic university “jealously maintains its independence of all outside authority.”105
This autonomy would prepare the University for its new mission: to be
secularized. As the report explained, to be secularized “means to come of
age, to come into the time and forms of the city of man today. It means a
new freedom for men to perfect the world in a non-religious way.”106 The
report was downplayed by Roesch, and its effect on the University is open
to serious doubt. Still, its conclusions represent a watershed moment in the
history of Catholic higher education, namely, the conclusion that the fulfill98. Id. at 33. As Philip Gleason remarked, this infighting “clearly reflected the postconciliar
breakdown of Catholic consensus on basic matters of doctrine and discipline.” GLEASON, supra
note 48, at 311.
99. Brown, supra note 89, at 91.
100. Beauregard, supra note 88, at 34.
101. Id. at 35.
102. Brown, supra note 89, at 92.
103. Id. (quoting, separately, a Dayton newspaper article and an interview with Lawrence
Ulrich, one of the accused professors).
104. Beauregard, supra note 88, at 36.
105. Id.
106. GLEASON, supra note 48, at 312.
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ment of a university’s Catholic intellectual identity requires the abandonment of its Catholic identity.
Today, the University of Dayton’s faculty handbook provides that
“[a]ll members of the faculty, whether tenured or not, are entitled to academic freedom as set forth in the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure.”107
d. The Catholic University of America
The Catholic University of America (CUA) is unique in that it is the
only pontifically chartered Catholic university in the United States. CUA
had been thought of as a model of academic freedom—“subject to neither
‘the hand of an order’ nor the pressure of a state legislature.”108 Yet, in the
spring of 1963, CUA barred the appearance of four invited speakers: Jesuits
John Courtney Murray and Gustave Weigel, Benedictine liturgical reformer
Godfrey Diekmann, and Hans Küng, a Swiss priest and peritus to the Second Vatican Council. When word of the ban was made known in the campus newspaper, public outcry soon followed.109 CUA’s rector, Monsignor
William J. McDonald feared that “giving a forum to these scholars might
seem to place his school on the liberal side in debate at the council.” Still,
the ban elicited a strong rebuke from the Catholic press and from several
bishops.110
Küng’s exclusion from CUA also had the effect of promoting his lecture tour, which went ahead as scheduled in dioceses and on Catholic campuses across the country, the theme of which was freedom in the Church.111
Küng’s lecture “did not, of course, cause the eruption of academic freedom
cases, outbursts of student rebelliousness, and demands for institutional autonomy that followed in the mid-and late sixties,”112 but it represented the
“new vision” of Catholic higher education that stood in sharp contrast to the
old order witnessed at CUA.
That “new vision” was embraced by a number of CUA faculty members, including a young priest-theologian from Rochester, New York,
named Charles Curran. Father Curran’s relationship with CUA presents a
tale of academic freedom told in three parts. Here, however, we wish to
focus on only the first two.113
107. Office of the Provost, University of Dayton Faculty Policy and Governance Handbook,
U. DAYTON 46 (2014), https://udayton.edu/provost/_resources/facadminaffairs/documents/August
_2014_UD_FacultyHandbook_Final.pdf.
108. Universities: Crisis at Catholic U., TIME, Mar. 29, 1963, at 58.
109. GLEASON, supra note 48, at 306.
110. Universities: Crisis at Catholic U., supra note 108.
111. At the conclusion of his tour, Commonweal published Küng’s lecture. Hans Küng, The
Church and Freedom, 78 COMMONWEAL 343 (1963).
112. GLEASON, supra note 48, at 308.
113. Nevertheless, so as not to leave the reader in suspense, in the third and final chapter of
the tale, CUA succeeded, through its own internal procedures and in the civil courts, in removing
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The first chapter in the controversy began in April 1967, when Bishop
William J. McDonald, the rector of CUA, informed an untenured Father
Curran that his contract with the University would not be renewed for the
following academic year. The decision followed from a review of Curran’s
work by a committee of three bishops appointed by CUA’s Board of Trustees.114 In his published work, Curran proposed not only new answers to
moral questions involving contraception, sex outside of marriage, and masturbation, but a new basis for determining morality: “the experience of
Christian people.”115 Curran’s dealings with the committee raised questions
as to his credibility.116 Substantively, the committee found that Curran’s
work was problematic and recommended that he not be retained. The Board
accepted the recommendation, but decided that it need not explain its reasons, even though Curran had received the unanimous recommendation of
the faculty of the School of Theology and the support of the faculty
senate.117
In response to McDonald’s news, Curran claimed that he had been
denied academic due process and said that he was prepared to contact the
media. He then rallied his colleagues in the School of Theology to his support. They likewise threatened to make the matter public and thereby damage the reputation of the University. “Their argument supporting Curran
was to be based entirely on the principles of academic freedom and would
not in any way address Curran’s theological position.”118 Curran’s supportFather Curran as a teacher of Catholic theology. This action was precipitated by a lengthy investigation into Father Curran’s published works by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith,
then headed by Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (the future Pope Benedict XVI). In 1986, the CDF
concluded that, given Father Curran’s open dissent from church teaching on such topics as “the
indissolubility of consummated sacramental marriage, abortion, euthanasia, masturbation, artificial contraception, premarital intercourse and homosexual acts,” Father Curran was no longer
“suitable nor eligible to exercise the function of a professor of Catholic theology,” and that it
reached this conclusion with the express approval of Pope John Paul II. Joseph Ratzinger, Letter
to Father Charles Curran, VATICAN (July 25, 1986), http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congrega
tions/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19860725_carlo-curran_en.html. Although he retained
his tenure at CUA, rather than stay at a university where he could not teach, Father Curran resigned and accepted appointments at other universities. Since 1991 he has served as a tenured
faculty member at Southern Methodist University.
114. The bishops were McDonald, Archbishop Philip Hannan of New Orleans, and Archbishop John Krol of Philadelphia. PETER M. MITCHELL, THE COUP AT CATHOLIC. UNIVERSITY:
THE 1968 REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN CATHOLIC EDUCATION 32 (2015). The works reviewed included Curran’s book Christian Morality Today and an interview article in the National Catholic
Reporter. See CHARLES E. CURRAN, CHRISTIAN MORALITY TODAY: THE RENEWAL OF MORAL
THEOLOGY (1966); Curran—No Monopoly of Spirit, NAT. CATH. REP. Sept. 21, 1966, at 2.
115. MITCHELL, supra note 114, at 29–30; LARRY WITHAM, CURRAN VS. CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY: A STUDY OF AUTHORITY AND FREEDOM IN CONFLICT 20 (1991).
116. MITCHELL, supra note 114, at 35 (noting that Cardinal Krol found that Curran engaged in
“doublespeak”); WITHAM, supra note 115 (noting that Curran claimed that the published interview
was inaccurate, but that the National Catholic Reporter claimed that it gave the article to Curran
in advance and that he made slight revisions).
117. MITCHELL, supra note 114, at 36.
118. Id. at 28.
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ers drafted a resolution calling for his reinstatement and the faculty organized an already restless student body. Faculty and students united in
peaceful rallies on campus in support of Curran and against the University
administration. They also implemented a strike that effectively shut down
the CUA campus for a week. The faculty made effective use of the media
which portrayed Curran as a likeable, avuncular figure and moderate theologian fighting an authoritarian power structure for the right to free speech,
due process, and academic freedom.119 In the face of mounting pressure, the
Board of Trustees capitulated by not only reinstating Curran, but inexplicably promoting him to the rank of associate professor with tenure.120
The second chapter in the Charles Curran saga took place the following year. On July 29, 1968, Pope Paul VI issued his much-anticipated encyclical on artificial contraception, Humanae Vitae. In it, the Pope
reaffirmed the Church’s historic teaching against contraception as contrary
to “the objective moral order which was established by God.”121 The day
before its release, Curran received a phone call from a correspondent at
Time magazine informing him that the letter would be publicly introduced
in Rome the next day. Curran obtained a copy of the text from Father James
T. McHugh at the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, and Curran,
along with CUA colleagues Daniel Maguire and Robert Hunt (both priest
theologians who would later leave the priesthood), collaborated to draft a
statement.122 In it, they severely criticized the papal document and dissented from its central teaching, concluding that “spouses may responsibly
decide according to their conscience that artificial contraception in some
circumstances is permissible and indeed necessary to preserve and foster
the values and sacredness of marriage.”123 They presented their views at a
press conference at the Mayflower Hotel the next day. In a matter of days,
the statement had gained the signatures of some six hundred Catholic
theologians.124
In response to the notoriety created by this public statement of dissent,
and the confusion it created with respect to church teaching, Patrick Cardinal O’Boyle, Archbishop of Washington, D.C., asked to meet with those
faculty who signed the statement, pursuant to his role as chancellor of
CUA. The meeting resulted in a stalemate: the theologians conceded nothing and even refused to cooperate with O’Boyle’s request to submit written
119. Id. at 57–67.
120. Id. at 44–55; WITHAM, supra note 115, at 22–24.
121. Paul VI, Encyclical Letter Humanae Vitae ¶ 10 (July 25, 1968), http://w2.vatican.va/
content/paul-vi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-vi_enc_25071968_humanae-vitae.html.
122. WITHAM, supra note 115, at 25–26; CHARLES E. CURRAN, LOYAL DISSENT: MEMOIR OF A
CATHOLIC THEOLOGIAN 50–51 (2006).
123. Statement by Catholic Theologians, Washington, D.C., July 30, 1968, reprinted in READINGS IN MORAL THEOLOGY NO. 8: DIALOGUE ABOUT CATHOLIC SEXUAL TEACHING 135, 136–37
(Charles E. Curran & Richard A. McCormick, S.J., eds., 1993).
124. MITCHELL, supra note 114, at 152.
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responses to questions concerning the exact meaning of their published
statement of dissent. The theologians claimed that Cardinal O’Boyle “had
no right to ask for such an explanation, even as chancellor of the university.
Curran stated that asking them for an explanation in and of itself violated
academic freedom.”125
CUA’s Board of Trustees decided to turn the matter over to a faculty
inquiry. In doing so, the American bishops subverted their own doctrinal
authority “and made concern for academic freedom paramount.”126 The
Marlowe Committee,127 as it became known (named for the engineer and
architecture professor who chaired it) issued a report on April 1, 1969, completely exonerating the theologians. The basis of this decision was the
norms of academic freedom set forth by the AAUP. The committee concluded that the dissenters’ statement rejecting Humanae Vitae was a “tenable theological position,”128 and that the style and manner of dissent had
been “dignified, grave, and measured.”129 Although not within the committee’s charge, the report concluded that the University’s statutes were inconsistent “with modern American practice in higher education” as reflected in
the AAUP standards, such that the CUA statutes could not be considered
binding.130 The report recommended that the University formally adopt the
1940 Statement but without the Limitations Clause permitting religiously
affiliated institutions to qualify the right to academic freedom.131 The report
was received and accepted by the Board of Trustees, and the University
proceeded to amend its statutes and bylaws.132
The Curran affair represented an enormously significant development
concerning the place and nature of academic freedom in Catholic higher
education, eclipsing the incidents at Notre Dame, St. John’s, and Dayton.
Following the 1967 faculty strike, the Board of Trustees “had pledged to
uphold” the AAUP principles of academic freedom.133 To be clear, the
Board at CUA never formally adopted the AAUP standards regarding academic freedom in its several instantiations. The Board did, however, scrupulously follow the AAUP statements on academic freedom and due
process in conducting the work of the Faculty Board of Inquiry.134 More
than this, the deference the Board showed to the AAUP standards—its
treatment of these standards as normative in practice, if not by formal adoption—communicated the idea that it was legitimate and appropriate for a
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 165.
Id. at 181.
Id. at 186–87; WITHAM, supra note 115, at 27.
MITCHELL, supra note 114, at 191.
Id. at 193.
Id.
Id. at 198.
Id. at 206–07, 227–32.
Id. at 151.
MITCHELL, supra note 114, at 180–81, 186.

\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\15-2\UST201.txt

2019]

unknown

Seq: 23

11-APR-19

ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY

14:19

275

Catholic university to follow these standards as part of the internal life of
the institution.
The theologians who dissented from the teaching of Humanae Vitae
were not subject to any ecclesiastical discipline or administrative penalty
from the University. Thus, as Philip Gleason rightly observes, the outcome
of the dispute “amounted to a practical victory for academic freedom in
Catholic higher education, even in the sensitive area of religious doctrine.”135 Indeed, the incident confirmed that theologians at a Catholic university could openly dissent from Church teaching at the highest level
without fear of repercussion. Being a Catholic theologian at Catholic University of America was akin to being an engineer at Purdue or a chemist at
MIT: the only basis for evaluation of one’s work was one’s peers within the
academic guild and specifically within one’s given scholarly discipline.
Everyone else lacked the necessary competence to make judgments in their
particular field of expertise.136
The Board made no effort to articulate its own standard for academic
freedom in a Catholic institution. Nor did it direct the CUA administration
to the hard work of setting forth such a standard—an omission that was not
remedied until 1991 (and then, only imperfectly), following the final denouement of the Curran drama.137
***
135. GLEASON, supra note 48, at 313.
136. The idea that the only person competent to judge the scholarly work of an academic is a
fellow academic, even where the field of study is theology, became the de rigueur response to any
suggestion that ecclesiastical authorities might have something to say about the truth of academic
opinions in a Catholic university. See, e.g., Can the Charles Currans Be Freed?: Zeroing in on
Freedom, 86 COMMONWEAL 316 (June 2, 1967), reprinted as Catholic Scholars Witness to Freedom: A Symposium, in THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY: A MODERN APPRAISAL 308 (Neil G. McCluskey, S.J. ed., 1970) (“The right to academic freedom on the part of the faculty is grounded in
demonstrated professional competency. . . . It is understood that competency does not necessarily
mean agreement with majority opinion, or with what are generally considered to be the safer, the
more orthodox, or the more traditional views—either in theology or in any other academic
field.”). This idea has been repeated, like a mantra, down through the years. See, e.g., Richard P.
McBrien, Why I Shall Not Seek a Mandate, 182 AM. 14 (Feb. 12, 2000) (arguing that he would not
seek a mandate from the local bishop and stating that he was qualified to teach theology in a
Catholic university because “[o]nly the academic administration of a university and college, and
the chair and faculty of a department are competent to determine those matters”).
137. CUA’s current statement on academic freedom is virtually indistinguishable from statements at the majority of the nation’s universities with respect to every academic discipline but
theology. With respect to theology, the CUA statement provides that the University “recognizes
that freedom of inquiry, thought and expression is requisite to the advancement of knowledge and
to the deepening of understanding in matters of faith.” Office of the Provost, Academic Freedom
at the Catholic University of America, CATH. U. AM. (June 4, 1991), https://provost.cua.edu/hand
book/Academic.cfm. It further provides that “Catholic theologians are expected to give assent to
the teachings of the magisterium in keeping with the various degrees of assent that are called for
by authoritative teaching. Differences arising over the interpretation and presentation of Church
teaching are resolved through dialogue of scholars with members of the magisterium, with due
recognition that final authority in matters of faith and morals lies with the magisterium.” Id.
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The conception of academic freedom that arose from and was exemplified by these four controversies found expression in two seminal documents
of the time—the Land O’Lakes Statement (1967) and The Catholic University in the Modern World statement (1972). These documents, discussed
next, represent an attempt by prominent Catholic educators to articulate the
nature of a modern Catholic university that included a robust, AAUP-style
conception of academic freedom.
3. Statements on Catholic Higher Education: Land O’Lakes and
The Catholic University in the Modern World
In 1967, representatives from eleven Catholic universities, together
with members from their sponsoring religious communities and two bishops, met at the Land O’Lakes retreat in northern Wisconsin.138 Under the
leadership of Notre Dame’s president, Rev. Theodore M. Hesburgh, C.S.C.,
the group gathered to discuss, clarify, and articulate their understanding of
the nature and purpose of a Catholic university. The document that they
prepared, The Nature of the Contemporary Catholic University, more commonly known as the Land O’Lakes Statement, proved to be deeply influential in the development of American Catholic higher education throughout
the remainder of the twentieth century.139
The Land O’Lakes Statement refers to “academic freedom,” though it
does not define the concept or offer a rationale for its acceptance. It does
say that “[t]he whole world of knowledge and ideas must be open” to students at a Catholic university, and that “there must be no outlawed books or
subjects.”140 But the focus of the Land O’Lakes Statement is not on the
academic freedom of students or faculty members. Its principal concern is
the institutional freedom of the Catholic university as a whole:
To perform its teaching and research functions effectively the
Catholic university must have a true autonomy and academic
freedom in the face of authority of whatever kind, lay or clerical,
external to the academic community itself. To say this is simply
to assert that institutional autonomy and academic freedom are
essential conditions to life and indeed survival for Catholic universities and for all universities.141
Although this declaration of institutional autonomy was ostensibly directed
against “authority of whatever kind,” in practice this proved to be inaccurate insofar as Catholic universities welcomed a vast array of authorities
“external to the academic community”—from government agencies like the
138. GLEASON, supra note 48, at 317.
139. Land O’Lakes Statement: The Nature of the Contemporary Catholic University, reprinted
in AMERICAN CATHOLIC HIGHER EDUCATION: ESSENTIAL DOCUMENTS, 1967—1990, 7 (Alice Gallin, O.S.U. ed., 1992).
140. Id. at 10.
141. Id. at 7.
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U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and the Environmental
Protection Agency to private organizations such as the National Collegiate
Athletic Association.142 Instead, the statement seeks to exclude one particular “authority” from the life of the university, namely, the authority of the
Catholic faith community itself—the authority of the Church.143
The document goes on to say that “the Catholic university must be an
institution (a community of learners or a community of scholars) in which
Catholicism is perceptibly present and effectively operative.”144 It insists
that a Catholic university must maintain a theology department, and it encourages interdisciplinary conversations related to theology. Beyond this,
however, the Land O’Lakes Statement makes no suggestion as to how a
university’s Catholic identity might be realized. It offered no method, program, or strategy to manifest the Catholic presence that it declared was so
essential.145 It did, however, affirm and guarantee the “internal autonomy”
of the different academic disciplines and respect for their “methods and
methodologies,” and it further declared that “[t]here must be no theological
or philosophical imperialism.”146 Indeed, the Land O’Lakes Statement in no
way suggests that a Catholic university may in any way limit a faculty
member’s academic freedom as a way of ensuring its Catholic identity.
In practice, the Land O’Lakes Statement was drafted to serve as a position paper for the International Federation of Catholic Universities (IFCU)
that planned to issue a more elaborate statement on the nature of a Catholic
university. In 1972, the IFCU published a more lengthy exposition of the
ideas set forth in the Land O’Lakes Statement entitled The Catholic University in the Modern World.147 Although the document touched on many aspects of Catholic identity in higher education, the document’s passages on

142. James T. Burtchaell, Part Four: External Authorities?, CRISIS MAG. (July 1, 1999),
https://www.crisismagazine.com/issues/archive/1999/july-august-1999.
143. James T. Burtchaell, C.S.C., Out of the Heartburn of the Church, 25 J.C. & U.L. 653,
655 (1999) (stating that the authors of the statement were indicating “that they now regarded their
bishops and religious superiors as ‘outsiders’ to the work of Catholic education”).
144. Land O’Lakes Statement, supra note 139.
145. See JAMES T. BURTCHAELL, THE DYING OF THE LIGHT: THE DISENGAGEMENT OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES FROM THEIR CHRISTIAN CHURCHES 595 (1998) (“Apart from that wary
welcome to theology, no other means to make Catholicism perceptibly present and effectively
active is mentioned.”).
146. Land O’Lakes Statement, supra note 139, at 8.
147. The Catholic University in the Modern World, in AMERICAN CATHOLIC HIGHER EDUCATION: ESSENTIAL DOCUMENTS, 1967–1990, supra note 139, at 37. In addition to the Land O’Lakes
Statement, other preparatory texts included the Kinshasa Statement: The Catholic University in the
Modern World (1968), in AMERICAN CATHOLIC HIGHER EDUCATION: ESSENTIAL DOCUMENTS,
1967–1990, supra note 139, at 13, and the Rome Statement: The Catholic University and the
Aggiornamento (1969), in AMERICAN CATHOLIC HIGHER EDUCATION: ESSENTIAL DOCUMENTS,
1967–1990, supra note 139, at 17.
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academic freedom and autonomy became the central focus of debate as the
document was considered by both educators and curial officials in Rome.148
Like its predecessor, The Catholic University in the Modern World
insists that “[t]o perform its teaching and research functions effectively a
Catholic university must have true autonomy and academic freedom.”149
The document makes explicit that the Catholic university’s autonomy in
conducting its own affairs includes “freedom in student admission policy, in
appointment of personnel, in teaching (with regard both to subjects taught
and to methods), and in research.”150 It grounds academic freedom in the
nature of the university, “which is the pursuit and transmission of truth.”151
Moreover, it describes this freedom in near absolute terms: “Any limitation
imposed on [the university] which would clash with this unconditioned attitude for pursuing truth would be intolerable and contrary to the very nature
of the university.”152
Notwithstanding this absolutist language, the document offers a more
nuanced account in addressing the “delicate balance to be maintained between the autonomy of a Catholic university and the responsibilities of the
Hierarchy.”153 This delicate balance is necessary because the Church, too,
is concerned with truth. The document acknowledges that the Church is
“the guardian of revealed truth” and as such has “the right and duty to
safeguard orthodoxy.”154 The task of the theologian at a Catholic university
is to “deepen the understanding” of the faith, whereas it is the task of the
Magisterium to evaluate the work of a theologian, and to judge “its authentic catholicity, and its conformity with divine revelation.”155 Those who
teach Catholic theology at a Catholic university “must present the authentic
doctrine of the Church.”156 At the same time, the document claims that
“theologians must be able to pursue their discipline in the same manner as
148. James Burtchaell notes that although the IFCU drafted The Catholic University in the
Modern World as “an official policy statement” expounding upon the ideas set forth in the Land
O’Lakes Statement, it was “adopted, not by the IFCU, where it encountered opposition, but by a
Congress of the Catholic Universities of the World, in Rome.” Burtchaell, supra note 143 at
656–57. See also GALLIN, supra note 70, at 127–39 (detailing the often-contentious process of
drafting the document and seeking its approval from curial officials). As with the Land O’Lakes
Statement, Rev. Theodore M. Hesburgh, C.S.C., played a major role in the preparation of The
Catholic University in the Modern World. For his thoughts on the process, see HESBURGH, supra
note 57, at 213–21.
149. The Catholic University in the Modern World, in AMERICAN CATHOLIC HIGHER EDUCATION: ESSENTIAL DOCUMENTS, 1967–1990, supra note 139, at 43.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 53.
154. Id.
155. The Catholic University in the Modern World, in AMERICAN CATHOLIC HIGHER EDUCATION: ESSENTIAL DOCUMENTS, 1967–1990, supra note 139, at 54.
156. Id.
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other research scholars.”157 They must, it says, be free to question and to
develop their hypotheses “with the full freedom of scholarly research.”158
What a theologian presents as the truth may not be consistent with the
teachings of the Church. When this happens, the document acknowledges
that the Church’s hierarchy has the authority to intervene “when it judges
the truth of the Christian message to be at stake.”159 However, this authority
“does not of itself imply the right of the Hierarchy to intervene in university
government or academic administration.”160 Instead, “Church authorities
will deal with the individual involved only as a member of the Church.”161
That is, “unless statutory relationships permit it, [the hierarchy’s actions]
will not involve a juridical intervention, whether direct or indirect, in the
institutional affairs of the university.”162 A bishop may not order the dismissal of a theologian from the university, even if he concludes that the
theologian’s work is heterodox. The bishop’s power is limited to “advising
the person involved, informing the administration, and . . . declaring such a
teaching incompatible with Catholic doctrine.”163
For some, The Catholic University in the Modern World appears to
square the circle of Catholic identity and academic freedom. It sets forth a
maximalist conception of academic freedom for all university professors
(including theologians) while offering a modest concession to one “outside
authority,” namely, the Church’s magisterium. The document acknowledges the bishops’ authority “to judge and declare whether a teaching that is
publicly proposed as Catholic is in fact such,” but says that this judgment
will “normally be left to [the theologian’s] peers.”164 Moreover, a bishop’s
authority is limited to voicing criticism. He has no role to play in the governance or administration of the Catholic university. The document strictly
maintains the university’s institutional autonomy. Even if the Church’s
magisterium concludes that the work of a university faculty member is “incompatible with Catholic doctrine,” such notice is merely advisory. It remains the responsibility of the university to decide “the necessary and
appropriate means to maintain its Catholic character.”165

157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 55.
160. Id.
161. The Catholic University in the Modern World, in AMERICAN CATHOLIC HIGHER EDUCATION: ESSENTIAL DOCUMENTS, 1967–1990, supra note 139, at 59.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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4. The Development of Academic Freedom at Loyola University
Chicago
Prior to Vatican II, Catholic colleges and universities sought to stake
out a position supporting both the academic freedom of individual faculty
members and the academic freedom of Catholic institutions of higher learning. Since the Council, almost without exception, Catholic colleges and universities have amended their policies to conform to the understanding of
academic freedom set forth in the AAC and AAUP’s 1940 Statement of
Principles. Today the statements and policies on academic freedom at Catholic colleges and universities are virtually indistinguishable from the analogous policies at secular schools. In this section, we examine these changes
by looking at the policies on academic freedom set forth in the faculty
handbooks of one Catholic university: Loyola University Chicago.
Loyola’s first Faculty Handbook, published in 1948, was a tentative
effort, or as Loyola President Rev. James T. Hussey, S.J., introduced it, an
“experimental one.”166 The document was, he admitted, “very incomplete.”
Indeed, the Handbook contained no policy on academic freedom (though it
is uncertain whether this omission was part of the incompleteness Hussey
had in mind). It did, however, contain several pages describing Loyola’s
Chapter of the AAUP. The chapter was founded in 1935 and “reactivated in
1946 as the outgrowth of a request by the President of the University that a
committee be selected by the lay faculty members to confer with him on
matters of faculty welfare.”167 Although the document does not mention
academic freedom, it does state that one of the purposes of the Loyola
Chapter of the AAUP is “to further the general interests of Catholic education and the particular aims and purposes of Loyola University.”168
The first “non-experimental” version of the Loyola Faculty Handbook
was published in 1962. Loyola has published a revised version of this
Handbook on eight subsequent occasions: 1965, 1969, 1972, 1979, 1983,
1993, 2009, and 2015. Although later versions of the Handbook differ from
the earlier versions in many important respects, the basic structure and contents can be traced back to the 1962 edition. To appreciate the significant
changes in the University’s policy regarding academic freedom, we will
examine certain key subjects in the Handbook and how they were revised or
eliminated in subsequent editions. These subjects address the University’s
formal policies on: (1) academic freedom; (2) the religious make-up of the
University’s faculty; (3) for-cause grounds for termination of a faculty
166. Letter from James T. Hussey, S.J. to all Members of the University Faculty and Staff
(Sept. 1, 1948), LUC Archives, Office of the President, Rev. Raymond C. Baumhart, S.J., Acc.
No. 82-19, Box 8 of 16, Location D/3A6.
167. THE FACULTY HANDBOOK, Loyola University of Chicago (1949) p. 49, LUC Archives,
Office of the President, Rev. Raymond C. Baumhart, S.J., Acc. No. 82-19, Box 8 of 16, Location
D/3A6.
168. Id.
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member; and (4) the availability of books listed on the Catholic Church’s
Index of Forbidden Books.
a. Academic Freedom
Loyola University’s policy on academic freedom has changed dramatically over the years, reflecting both developments in Catholic higher education and the Church more broadly.
Loyola’s policy on academic freedom in its 1962 Faculty Handbook169
is remarkable in that it reflects the University’s dedication both to free inquiry and to preserving its Catholic identity. A number of features are particularly noteworthy. First, the statement grounds the University’s
commitment to academic freedom in its dedication to “truth,” the communication of which is the “primary purpose of education.”170 From this purpose
it follows that “[e]very teacher . . . in virtue of his office has not only the
right but the duty to participate freely in the search for and the communication of truth.”171 This is the foundation upon which the “[a]cademic freedom to discover and teach the truth is guaranteed to the teacher.”172
In itself, grounding the idea of academic freedom in the search for and
communication of truth is not out of the ordinary. The AAUP’s 1940 Statement does as much.173 The difference is that the Loyola Faculty Handbook
makes explicit its particular conception of truth—“the perceived relationship of conformity between the mind and its object.”174 It also defends truth
as something that is objective and therefore mind-independent. Thus, truth
is something that the “knower perceives,” but “he does not produce it.”175
Similarly, the statement contends that “subjective conviction is not a criterion of truth.”176
Second, Loyola’s statement on academic freedom reflects the traditional Catholic view on the unity of truth—that there is “only one objective
truth”—but that there are “two different paths to [that] truth,” namely, “reason and revelation.”177 This distinction, between truths that “can be arrived
at by the use of natural powers” and “other truths which God has re169. LOYOLA UNIV. CHI., OFFICE OF THE PROVOST, FACULTY HANDBOOK 20–21 (1962) [hereinafter 1962 FACULTY HANDBOOK]. The full text of the statement in the 1962 Loyola Faculty
Handbook is set forth in the Appendix. See Appendix infra.
170. 1962 FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra note 169, at 20.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. 1940 Statement, supra note 33, at 14 (“Institutions of higher education are conducted for
the common good and not to further the interest of either the individual teacher or the institution
as a whole. The common good depends upon the free research for truth and its free exposition. . . .
Freedom in research is fundamental to the advancement of truth.”).
174. 1962 FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra note 169, at 20.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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vealed,”178 is a mainstay of Catholic teaching found not only in the NeoScholasticism still dominant at the time of the 1962 Handbook, but in the
Church’s historic understanding of the relationship between reason and
faith, philosophy and theology, nature and grace. The unicity of truth means
that “whatever is learned by one method cannot be in contradiction to what
is learned by another” and that “[a]ny opposition [between the two] is
merely apparent.”179
Third, the statement recognizes that “[a]cademic freedom . . . implies
not only rights but correlative duties.”180 The statement makes clear that the
reality of truth and the fact that it can be sought and grasped by the human
mind entails certain consequences for teachers and the legitimate scope of
academic freedom. “No teacher . . . should ever teach anything that contradicts certain truth, whether that truth be known to him from its own evidence, from reliable human authority, or from the Catholic Church speaking
within its legitimate scope.”181 Moreover, “[a]s a Catholic institution of
higher learning Loyola expects all its faculties to exercise their right of
academic freedom without teaching anything that violates doctrines of faith
or morals of the Catholic Church.”182 Finally, the 1962 policy makes plain
that serious consequences can follow from violating the University’s policy:
“Any grave offense against these canons shall be considered just cause for
dismissal from the Loyola faculty.”183
The final paragraphs of the statement on academic freedom in
Loyola’s 1962 Handbook are essentially an extended quotation from the
1940 Statement. One of these quotations appears to contradict the earlier
passages concerning the limitations that truth imposes on the exercise of
academic freedom. Thus, the 1962 Handbook provides that a teacher “is
entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication of its results,
subject to the adequate performance of his other academic duties.”184 To
reconcile this claim with the apparent limitation on academic freedom
quoted above, it must be the case that this “full freedom” in research and
publication must be exercised “without teaching anything that violates doctrines of faith or morals of the Catholic Church.”185
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. 1962 FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra note 169, at 20.
181. Id.
182. Id. Beyond the teachings of the Catholic Church, the statement also provides that a
Loyola faculty member should not teach “anything that is contrary to the principles of American
government as set forth in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United
States.” Id.
183. Id. at 20.
184. Compare 1962 FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra note 169, at 21, with 1940 Statement, supra
note 33, at 14.
185. 1962 FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra note 169, at 20.
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Again quoting from the 1940 Statement, the 1962 Handbook further
provides that when the teacher acts in his role as a “citizen” he is “free of
institutional censorship or discipline.”186 Nevertheless, in this role, he is
subject to “special obligations”187 because “the public may judge his profession and his institution by his utterances.” Accordingly, a teacher who
speaks as a citizen “should at all times be accurate, should exercise appropriate restraint, should show respect for the opinions of others, and should
make every effort to indicate that he is not an institutional spokesman.”188
This same passage, regarding the freedom of Loyola faculty members as
citizens, remained a part of Loyola’s Faculty Handbook in all subsequent
editions until the 1993 edition.189
Similar to its immediate predecessor, the 1965 Loyola Faculty Handbook identified the purpose of education as being “the free and unhampered
communication of truth.”190 But unlike the 1962 version, the 1965 version
did not set forth an understanding of what “truth” is (e.g. as the correspondence of mind and object), nor did it state that truth was objective, or that it
could be known through different paths (i.e. through the exercise of human
reason and through revelation).
The 1965 edition defined academic freedom as “the freedom of the
scholar to speak and write on the areas of learning in which he is competent.”191 Similar to the 1962 version, the 1965 edition guaranteed the right
of a faculty member “to discover and teach truth within the areas of his
competence” subject to the “scholar’s responsible and prudent judgment,
and to the correlative obligation to recognize and to respect the rights and
convictions of others, including the institution of which he is a part.”
Like its predecessor, the 1965 Handbook set forth a limitation on the
right to academic freedom related to Loyola’s Catholic identity:
Academic freedom in church-related institutions of higher learning is universally understood within the terms of the religious beliefs of the church. The faculty of Loyola University, therefore,
agrees in the exercise of academic freedom not to attack the
teaching of the Roman Catholic Church regarding faith and
morals.192
With some slight variation, this same statement—excepting attacks on
Catholic teaching from an otherwise capacious right of academic free186. Compare 1962 FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra note 169, at 21, with 1940 Statement, supra
note 33, at 14.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. This passage remained in the Handbook through the 1983 edition. The 1993, 2009, and
2015 versions contain an abbreviated version of the same point.
190. LOYOLA UNIV. CHI., OFFICE OF THE PROVOST, FACULTY HANDBOOK 25 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 FACULTY HANDBOOK].
191. Id.
192. Id. at 25–26.
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dom—was also a part of the 1969, 1972, and 1983 versions of the Loyola
Faculty Handbook.193 By providing notice of this limitation in its Faculty
Handbook, Loyola sought to satisfy the conditions for the proper invocation
of the Limitations Clause in the 1940 Statement by stating clearly the
“[l]imitations of academic freedom because of [the] religious . . . aims of
the institution.”194
Unlike the 1962 version, the statement on academic freedom in the
1965 edition no longer warned faculty that violating the policy would be
“considered just cause for dismissal from the Loyola faculty.”195 However,
the significance of this omission can be easily overstated. As noted below,
the 1965, 1969, 1972, 1979, and 1983 editions of the Loyola Faculty Handbook each contained language allowing for the dismissal of faculty, including tenured faculty, “for-cause” for attacking Catholic teaching.
The phrase excepting attacks on Catholic teaching from the scope of
academic freedom at Loyola was eliminated in the 1993 edition of the
Loyola Faculty Handbook. It replaced this exception with the following
language:
Academic freedom in church related institutions of high learning
requires application of the same principles mentioned above with
regard to the authoritative teaching and tradition of the Church to
which the University is related, in the case of Loyola University,
to the Catholic Church.196
Gone is the idea that Loyola faculty must agree not to “attack” Catholic
teaching on faith and morals.197 Instead, the restraints on the exercise of
academic freedom “mentioned above” are now entirely internal and prudential—that a faculty member “should strive at all times to be accurate, exercise appropriate restraint and judgment, foster and defend intellectual
honesty and freedom of inquiry, show respect for the rights of others to
express ideas and opinions. . . .”198 Whereas the 1962 edition demanded
that a faculty member show restraint by not teaching “anything that contradicts certain truth,” including those truths taught by the authority of Catho193. The 1969, 1972, and 1979 Handbooks state that the Loyola faculty “agrees in the exercise of academic freedom not to attack universal Catholic doctrine.” LOYOLA UNIV. CHI., OFFICE
OF THE PROVOST, FACULTY HANDBOOK 29 (1969) [hereinafter 1969 FACULTY HANDBOOK] ;
LOYOLA UNIV. CHI., OFFICE OF THE PROVOST, FACULTY HANDBOOK 36 (1972) [hereinafter 1972
FACULTY HANDBOOK] ; LOYOLA UNIV. CHI., OFFICE OF THE PROVOST, FACULTY HANDBOOK 37
(1979) [hereinafter 1979 FACULTY HANDBOOK] . The 1983 Handbook states that the Loyola
faculty “agrees in the exercise of academic freedom to respect authoritative Catholic teaching and
tradition.” LOYOLA UNIV. CHI., OFFICE OF THE PROVOST, FACULTY HANDBOOK 38 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 FACULTY HANDBOOK] .
194. 1940 Statement, supra note 33, at 14.
195. 1962 FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra note 169, at 20.
196. LOYOLA UNIV. CHI., OFFICE OF THE PROVOST, FACULTY HANDBOOK 10 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 FACULTY HANDBOOK].
197. See supra notes 192 and 193.
198. 1993 FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra note 196, at 10.
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lic Church, the restraint suggested in the 1993 edition was only a matter of
etiquette—that a faculty member show “respect” for the opinions of others.
The most recent Loyola Faculty Handbooks, published in 2009 and
2015, dilute the language in the 1993 version even further:
The principles of academic freedom apply to church-related institutions of higher learning, such as Loyola, which take into consideration the authoritative teaching and tradition of the church to
which the institution is related (in the case of Loyola, the Roman
Catholic Church).199
The latest Faculty Handbook does not explain what it would mean for a
faculty member to “take into consideration the authoritative teaching and
tradition of the church” in the exercise of academic freedom.
b. The Religious Make-up of the Faculty
The 1962 edition of the Loyola University of Chicago Faculty Handbook
states that
[a]lthough Loyola University is a Jesuit University, there is no
regulation requiring all members of the faculty to be members of
the Catholic faith. A faculty member is expected to maintain a
standard of life and conduct consistent with the philosophy and
objectives of Loyola, and the integrity of the University requires
that all faculty members shall maintain a sympathetic attitude towards Catholic beliefs and practices.200
The exact same language appears in the 1965 edition of the Handbook.201
This language could be construed as a limit on academic freedom. The
1962 edition neither defined nor sought to illustrate what “maintain[ing] a
sympathetic attitude toward Catholic beliefs and practices” would require.
Similarly, the 1969 edition, which substituted the word “respect” for “sympathetic attitude” did not indicate what “respect” for Catholic beliefs would
entail. An “attitude” denotes an internal disposition, but this raises the question as to how such an attitude could be discerned or measured. “Respect”
may likewise indicate an internal disposition, though “respect” is often
shown in outward signs and gestures. Given the practical difficulties in the
non-arbitrary enforcement of such a norm, the function of this language
may be expressive rather than juridical.
As noted above, the wording in the text was changed slightly in the
1969 edition to state that “[t]he integrity of the University . . . requires that
all faculty members respect Catholic beliefs.”202 The 1972 edition broad199. LOYOLA UNIV. CHI., OFFICE OF THE PROVOST, FACULTY HANDBOOK 39 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 FACULTY HANDBOOK] ; LOYOLA. UNIV. CHI., OFFICE OF THE PROVOST, FACULTY HANDBOOK 34 (2015) [hereinafter 2015 FACULTY HANDBOOK] .
200. 1962 FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra note 169, at 19–20.
201. 1965 FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra note 190, at 25.
202. 1969 FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra note 193, at 28.
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ened this, stating that “[t]he integrity of any university . . . requires that its
faculty respect all religious beliefs.”203 The phrase was changed again in the
1983 edition to say that “[t]he integrity of this University requires that all its
faculty members respect both the religious convictions of all and the Catholic and Jesuit tradition of their institution.”204
The entire passage was deleted from the Handbook beginning with the
1993 edition. Since that time, the Handbook has made no mention of either
the religious composition of the faculty, or of the need for faculty to be
“sympathetic” to or show “respect” for the Catholic faith.
c. For-Cause Grounds for Termination of a Faculty Member
The 1962 Loyola Faculty Handbook made clear that even a tenured faculty
member could be dismissed for attacking the Catholic Church. “Any faculty
member who in his teaching or professional activity is guilty of a grave
offense against Catholic doctrine or morality or who is involved in a public
crime or scandal may be dismissed immediately” by the ultimate authority
in the University, the Jesuit Board of Trustees.205 The 1965 Handbook revised this language slightly, providing that “[g]rounds for dismissal include
. . . attacking certain Catholic doctrine in teaching, lecturing, or writing.”206
This language was amended again in the 1969 Handbook which provided
that a faculty member could be dismissed for “attacking universal Catholic
doctrine in teaching, lecturing, or publishing when one specifically identifies himself as a member of the University faculty.”207 Nearly identical language appears in the 1972 and 1979 Handbooks.208 This ground for
dismissal was somewhat altered in the 1983 Handbook which provided that
a faculty member could be dismissed for “attacking and ridiculing authoritative Catholic teaching.”209 Ten years later, the 1993 Handbook completely eliminated this ground for dismissal, and no analogous passage has
appeared in any subsequent edition.210
The authors of these earlier versions of the Loyola Faculty Handbook
seem to have believed that, as a Catholic institution, Loyola stands for
203. 1972 FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra note 193, at 36. The 1979 edition altered this slightly,
replacing “any university” with “Loyola University.” 1979 FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra note 193,
at 37.
204. 1983 FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra note 193, at 38.
205. 1962 FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra note 169, at 22.
206. 1965 FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra note 190, at 27–28.
207. 1969 FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra note 193, at 27.
208. 1972 FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra note 193, at 29 (providing for faculty dismissal for
“attacking universal Catholic doctrine in teaching, lecturing, or publishing when functioning as or
specifically identifying oneself as a member of the University faculty”); accord 1979 FACULTY
HANDBOOK, supra note 193, at 29.
209. 1983 FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra note 193, at 32.
210. 1993 FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra note 196, at 28 (listing causes for dismissal); accord
2009 FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra note 199, at 62–63, 67; 2015 FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra note
199, at 55–56, 59.
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something—a religious identity that makes truth claims about the world—
and that the University cannot advance this identity with integrity if it provides a platform to those whose practice is to undermine it. Dismissal of a
faculty member from a position with tenure is, of course, the most extreme
act that an institution can take with respect to a professor with whom it is
dissatisfied. As such, this passage would seem to represent a clear threat to
academic freedom, traditionally understood. Nevertheless, the 1940 Statement implicitly recognizes the legitimacy of such an action in the Limitations Clause.
d. Access to the Index of Prohibited Books
Beginning in the sixteenth century—at the peak of the Reformation
and the creation of the Roman Inquisition—the Catholic Church maintained
a list of forbidden books, the Index Librorum Prohibitorum, or simply “the
Index.”211 The Roman curial office responsible for the Index did not,
strictly speaking, censor the books listed. Rather, it maintained the list as a
public notice to faithful Catholics to avoid certain materials that could be
damaging to the faith. To knowingly read these materials was deemed sinful. Still, Church authorities made exceptions, granting permission to certain individuals for special reasons.
The 1962 Loyola Faculty Handbook refers to this practice:
Books on the Index. The President of the University is authorized
to extend to Catholic members of the Faculty and to Catholic students permission to read books on the Index. These requests are
to be made through the office of the Vice-President and Dean of
Faculties.212
The 1965 Handbook contained the same language but added that following
a request to read materials on the Index, “[t]he professor may presume that
the permission is granted twenty-four hours after returning the forms.”213
Pope Paul VI abolished the Index in 1966. After the 1965 edition, no
subsequent Loyola Faculty Handbook made any mention of the Index or
restrictions on materials faculty and students might wish to read.
***
The developments regarding academic freedom in the Loyola University Chicago Faculty Handbook are representative of what took place at
most Catholic institutions of higher learning during this period. The initial
formulation of academic freedom was tied to a substantive conception of
the truth, one that was part of the university’s pursuit of the truth sought and
211. Joseph Hilgers, Index of Prohibited Books, in 7 THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 721,
721–22 (Charles G. Herbermann et al. eds., 1910), https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=nyp.3343
3070780311;view=1up;seq=785.
212. 1962 FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra note 169, at 34.
213. 1965 FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra note 190, at 41.
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affirmed by the Church. Over the course of the following three decades,
Catholic universities shifted toward the AAUP conception of academic
freedom, with little to no relationship to the faith community of which they
were ostensibly a part.
5. Ex Corde Ecclesiae and the Real Problem Plainly Stated
In 1990, after more than a decade of deliberation and consultation between university leaders, bishops, and the Holy See, Pope John Paul II issued his Apostolic Constitution governing Catholic universities entitled Ex
Corde Ecclesiae.214 The document sets forth the characteristics that a university or college must possess and make present if it is to be authentically
Catholic. Furthermore, it re-imagines the relationship between Catholic
identity and academic freedom in a way that resolves what others had assumed to be an irreconcilable conflict.
Many Catholic universities describe their Catholic identity as a “Christian witness” or “Christian presence” or “Christian atmosphere” within the
work of an otherwise generic university. Ex Corde eschews these descriptions and refers bluntly to “the higher truth that comes from the Gospel”215
and “fidelity to the Christian message as it comes to us through the
Church.”216 In this way, the alleged tension between being Catholic and
being a university is placed flatly on the table. The “tension” that other
documents acknowledge217 is no longer a matter of atmospherics—such as
crucifixes on the wall and other devotional symbols on campus, or the number of Catholic personnel or members of the sponsoring religious order, or
even the inclination to raise questions that address the moral dimensions of
life—though each of these relates to the crux of what is at issue. The heart
of the matter is that, as a Catholic institution, the Catholic university makes
certain truth claims on topics that may be the subject of inquiry in the various disciplines within the academy.
But in contrast to the typical formulation, Ex Corde states this relationship not as a tension but as a virtue. As John Paul II states in the first few
lines of the document: “A Catholic university’s privileged task is ‘to unite
existentially by intellectual effort two orders of reality that too frequently
214. JOHN PAUL II, APOSTOLIC CONSTITUTION Ex Corde Ecclesiae (Aug. 15, 1990), http://
w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/apost_constitutions/documents/hf_jp-ii_apc_15081990_excorde-ecclesiae.html [hereinafter EX CORDE ECCLESIAE].
215. Id. ¶ 46.
216. Id. ¶ 13.
217. When this acknowledgement takes place, it is often accompanied by the famous quote
from George Bernard Shaw that a Catholic university is a “contradiction in terms.” See Theodore
M. Hesburgh, C.S.C., Introduction: The Challenge and Promise of a Catholic University, in THE
CHALLENGE AND PROMISE OF A CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY 4 (Theodore M. Hesburgh C.S.C. ed.,
1994).
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tend to be placed in opposition as though they were antithetical: the search
for truth and the certainty of already knowing the fount of truth.’”218
Far from being antithetical, these “two orders of reality” complement
one another. John Paul here quotes St. Augustine, “Intellege ut credas;
crede ut intellegas,” explaining that “the united endeavor of intelligence
and faith will enable people to come to the full measure of their humanity,
created in the image and likeness of God.”219 In his encyclical letter Fides
et Ratio,220 John Paul II expands upon this point, arguing that these “two
orders of reality” are in fact necessary accompaniments to one another.
“Credo ut intelligo” (I believe so that I may understand). “Intellego ut
credam” (I think so that I may believe). Thinking cannot take place without
a starting point, without a belief, a firm place of departure from which one’s
ruminations proceed. And, one cannot believe without thinking, for then
belief would be not an intellectual act but an act of the will alone—a mere
choice to treat the world as one wishes it to be,221 a choice that may, by
happenstance, coincide with how things are, but one that is not grounded in
existence.
Bringing these two orders of reality together is essential for anyone
who would seek to understand the universe, for anyone who would seek to
know the truth of existence. That is, every exercise of reason, every intellectual act (including scientific inquiry) begins with an act of faith.222 What
distinguishes the Catholic university (and, in the first instance, the Catholic
intellectual) is not the fact of such pre-ratiocinating conviction, but the content of the beliefs that are held, which form the starting point for rational
thinking and which are themselves subject to the probing examination of
rational thought.
218. EX CORDE ECCLESSIAE, supra note 214, ¶ 1 (quoting Pope John Paul II, Discourse to the
Catholic Institute of Paris (June 1, 1980), http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/fr/speeches/
1980/june/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_19800601_institut-catholique.html). Marvin O’Connell describes the apparent tension in this fashion: “The Catholic church claims to be the repository of all
truth. But a university exists on the assumption that truth, in its manifold and myriad manifestations, remains always to be discovered and refined. Therefore Catholicism and a genuine university experience are radically incompatible.” Marvin R. O’Connell, A Catholic University,
Whatever That May Mean, in THE CHALLENGE AND PROMISE OF A CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY 233,
237 (Theodore M. Hesburgh ed., 1994).
219. EX CORDE ECCLESSIAE, supra note 214, ¶ 5.
220. John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Fides et Ratio ¶¶ 16–35 (Sept. 14, 1998), http://w2.vatican
.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_14091998_fides-et-ratio.html.
221. For example, “I believe in unicorns because they are so beautiful and the world would be
a better place with such creatures in it” or “I believe I will win the lottery because I really need the
money.”
222. Joseph Ratzinger, later Pope Benedict XVI, has made this penetrating point on numerous
occasions. See Benedict XVI, Lecture of the Holy Father at Aula Magna of the University of
Regensburg, Faith, Reason, and the University: Memories and Reflection (Sept. 12, 2006), http://
w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/speeches/2006/september/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_2006
0912_university-regensburg.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2019).
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Like other universities, a Catholic university has “the “honor and responsibility” to seek the truth. But unlike non-Catholic institutions, a Catholic university has the virtue of being able to think more fully and more
widely, precisely because a Catholic university “is distinguished by its free
search for the whole truth about nature, man, and God.”223 Indeed, John
Paul makes what many undoubtedly see as an audacious claim, namely that,
by its Catholic character, a university is better prepared to engage in the
academic enterprise: that “by its Catholic character, a university is made
more capable of conducting an impartial search for truth, a search that is
neither subordinated to nor conditioned by any particular interests of any
kind.”224 This is not simply an institutional advantage but one that extends
to individuals. “The Christian researcher should demonstrate the way in
which human intelligence is enriched by the higher truth that comes from
the Gospel.”225
This is not, in fact, the view held by most American intellectuals. This
is not the view embodied in the 1940 Statement. That is, the 1940 Statement
reflects the fear that the dogmatic beliefs of a religious community will
cripple the academic enterprise, restricting what can be thought and questioned, limiting the scope and direction of inquiry that can be pursued in the
scholarly process. A closely held belief certainly can have that effect, but
this is true of all belief, not simply religious belief. Moreover, this overlooks the unavoidable presence of belief in the exercise of reason in
whatever field, and the liberating and illuminating function that belief can
play in the scholarly process. Contrary to the 1940 Statement, Ex Corde
Ecclesiae contends that the Catholic university can engage in the search for
truth in a way that is superior to its secular counterparts.
The document goes further and expresses the hope that the Catholic
university will exert influence on academic culture generally and by extension the wider culture. By fulfilling its mission in the world, the Catholic
university holds the promise of
affecting and, as it were, upsetting, through the power of the Gospel, humanity’s criteria of judgment, determining values, points
of interest, lines of thought, sources of inspiration and models of

223. EX CORDE ECCLESSIAE, supra note 214, ¶ 4 (emphasis added).
224. Id. ¶ 7 (emphasis added).
225. Id. ¶ 46 (emphasis added). The document then goes on to quote Pope Paul VI: “The
intelligence is never diminished, rather, it is stimulated and reinforced by that interior fount of
deep understanding that is the word of God, and by the hierarchy of values that result from it. . . .
In its unique manner, the Catholic university helps to manifest the superiority of the spirit, that can
never, without the risk of losing its very self, be placed at the service of something other than the
search for truth.” See Pope Paul VI, Address to Delegates of the International Federation of Catholic Universities (Nov. 27, 1972), https://w2.vatican.va/content/paul-vi/fr/speeches/1972/november/
documents/hf_p-vi_spe_19721127_universita-cattoliche.html.

\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\15-2\UST201.txt

2019]

unknown

Seq: 39

11-APR-19

ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY

14:19

291

life, which are in contrast with the Word of God and the plan of
salvation.226
Ex Corde Ecclesiae also recognizes the importance of academic freedom in
the life a Catholic university, though this freedom is not without limits. The
document provides that a Catholic university “possesses that institutional
autonomy necessary to perform its functions effectively and guarantees its
members academic freedom, so long as the rights of the individual person
and of the community are preserved within the confines of the truth and the
common good.”227 The Church recognizes and accepts “the academic freedom of scholars in each discipline in accordance with its own principles and
proper methods, and within the confines of the truth and the common
good.”228 Article 4 of the General Norms section of Ex Corde Ecclesiae
requires all Catholic teachers “to be faithful to, and all other teachers . . . to
respect, Catholic doctrine and morals in their research and teaching.”229
Ex Corde Ecclesiae is perhaps best known for its treatment of Catholic
theology and academic freedom. Ex Corde provides: “Catholic theologians,
aware that they fulfill a mandate received from the church, are to be faithful
to the magisterium of the church as the authentic interpreter of sacred Scripture and sacred tradition.”230 The document then cites canon 812 of the
Code of Canon Law which provides: “Those who teach theological disciplines in any institutes of higher studies whatsoever must have a mandate
from the competent ecclesiastical authority.”231 At the same time, Ex Corde
226. EX CORDE ECCLESSIAE, supra note 214, ¶ 48 (quoting Pope Paul VI, Apostolic Exhortation Evangelii Nuntiandi ¶¶ 17–18 (Dec. 8, 1975), http://w2.vatican.va/content/paul-vi/en/
apost_exhortations/documents/hf_p-vi_exh_19751208_evangelii-nuntiandi.html).
227. Id. ¶ 12. The accompanying footnote elaborates on this somewhat: “Institutional autonomy means that the governance of an academic institution is and remains internal to the institution.” Id. ¶ 12, n.15. This should allay the very real fears of Father Hesburgh and others, that
ecclesiastical figures could directly interfere in the operation of the university in decisions regarding appointments of faculty. The footnote further explains that “academic freedom is the guarantee given to those involved in teaching and research that, within their specific specialized branch
of knowledge and according to the methods proper to that specific area, they may search for the
truth wherever analysis and evidence lead them, and may teach and publish the results of this
search, keeping in mind the cited criteria, that is, safeguarding the rights of the individual and
society within the confines of the truth and the common good.” Id.; see also id. Art. 2, § 5.
228. Id. ¶ 29. See also id. Art. 2, § 5.
229. EX CORDE ECCLESSIAE, supra note 214, Art. 4, § 3. Just as the language requiring faculty
to show “respect” toward Catholic faith and morals was not defined in the Loyola Faculty Handbook, Ex Corde Ecclesiae does not specify what “respect” for Catholic doctrine and morals entails. Id.; see also supra notes 180–199 and accompanying text. Nor does it explain the
consequences for a Catholic teacher who fails to be faithful to “Catholic doctrine and morals in
their research and teaching.” Id. It is easy to imagine that a scientist who failed to abide by a
university’s policy on the treatment of human subjects by either endangering the life of an unborn
child or by using fetal remains obtained through abortion could be subject to internal discipline,
even perhaps dismissal. But Ex Corde Ecclesiae does not explain the consequences for a professor
of moral philosophy who faithfully taught her students the Church’s teaching on contraception set
forth in Humanae Vitae, and then proceeded to explain why that teaching was in error.
230. Id. ¶ 27.
231. 1983 CODE c.812.

\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\15-2\UST201.txt

292

unknown

Seq: 40

UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL

11-APR-19

14:19

[Vol. 15:2

states that theologians enjoy the same academic freedom as other faculty
“so long as they are faithful to the[ ] principles and methods [that define
theology as a branch of knowledge].”232
Although Ex Corde Ecclesiae provided a coherent and distinctive conception of academic freedom for Catholic universities, its impact on Catholic higher education has been modest. Beyond stimulating some needed
conversations about the nature of Catholic identity in the context of university education, few if any institutions have modified their AAUP-based conception of academic freedom in response to Ex Corde’s challenging claims.
D. Summary of the History of Academic Freedom in American Catholic
Universities
In sum, the history of academic freedom policies at Catholic colleges
and universities in the United States was first marked by underdevelopment: the freedom of faculty to teach and conduct research was, as a general
matter, not articulated in a formal policy but was observed in practice where
it was assumed by all sides that faculty would not contradict Church teaching. In the 1960s, Catholic schools began to adopt formal policies that embodied the conception of academic freedom set forth in the 1940 Statement
on Academic Freedom and Tenure. They did so believing that true academic freedom was unavoidably in tension with their professed Catholic
identity. In 1990, Pope John Paul II challenged this supposed tension, arguing in Ex Corde Ecclesiae that a robust affirmation of Catholic truth was
entirely consistent with academic freedom, rightly understood. Although Ex
Corde has encouraged some Catholic colleges and universities to once
again reflect on the meaning of their Catholic identity, it has not prompted
these schools to revise their policies with respect to academic freedom.
II. THE AAUP CONCEPTION OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM: AT BEST,
QUESTION-BEGGING; AT WORST, INTERNALLY INCOHERENT
In the sections that follow, we critique the AAUP conception of academic freedom on two grounds: that it is unjustified and therefore questionbegging, and that it is internally incoherent. This critique then lays the
ground for Part III, where we provide a tentative articulation of a policy
regarding academic freedom for Catholic universities today.
A. The AAUP’s Conception of Academic Freedom is (at Best and at
Least) Question-Begging
Any given conception of academic freedom is contingent upon a particular conception of the university in which this freedom is to be exercised.
There is no such thing as a pure or pristine, unadorned thing called a “uni232. EX CORDE ECCLESSIAE, supra note 214, ¶ 29.
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versity.” The university is not a natural kind.233 Instead, there are different
conceptions and different instantiations of the university in history and
throughout the world. These include, for instance, secular, public, Catholic,
Jewish, thirteenth-century English, and nineteenth-century German universities, among many others.
The AAUP conception of academic freedom assumes that a secular
university is the neutral or natural manifestation of a university. It identifies
academic freedom as the freedom to pursue truth, as defined by the contours of each particular discipline which possesses its own methods and
standards for the making of claims warranted within its field of study.234 A
discipline’s members, as experts in these standards and methods, are best
able to employ them and therefore to make epistemically warranted claims.
For example, astronomers have the expertise to make epistemically warranted claims as defined by the terms of the discipline of astronomy. This
famously included the hypothesis that the earth revolves around the sun, a
hypothesis epistemically warranted because it more elegantly and comprehensively explained the observed movement of celestial bodies.235 By contrast, law professors may not make warranted astronomical claims236
because truth is discipline-specific, and those outside the discipline—such
as experts in other fields of study and inquiry, administrators, and (especially for our purposes) religious authorities—cannot and should not interfere with the expert’s pursuit and articulation of epistemically-warranted
truth within the discipline.
There are, however, other reasonable conceptions of the “university”
with their own entailed conceptions of academic freedom. One of these alternative conceptions is the Catholic conception.237 Under this conception,
the various disciplines within the university are discrete means of ascertaining the full and all-encompassing truth about reality, within the domain of
and under the standards particular to each discipline. The Catholic university seeks to embody a vision that integrates the knowledge of the various
disciplines within a single, unified vision of reality.238 So defined, the Catholic conception of the university is entirely compatible with the AAUP’s.
233. Cf. SAUL A. KRIPKE, NAMING AND NECESSITY (1991).
234. See MATTHEW W. FINKIN & ROBERT C. POST, FOR THE COMMON GOOD: PRINCIPLES OF
AMERICAN ACADEMIC FREEDOM 54–61 (2009) (describing the theoretical foundation of academic
freedom as the discipline-centric pursuit of the truth).
235. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE COPERNICAN REVOLUTION: PLANETARY ASTRONOMY IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF WESTERN THOUGHT (1957).
236. At least those who are not trained astronomers.
237. For a particularly thoughtful perspective on the meaning of a Catholic university, see
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, GOD, PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITIES: A SELECTIVE HISTORY OF THE CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION (2009).
238. Cf. FRANCIS CARDINAL GEORGE, OMI, A GODLY HUMANISM: CLARIFYING THE HOPE
THAT LIES WITHIN 135 (2015) (“The modern research university is characterized by departmentalization of knowledge. This departmentalization, more than any explicit intention, caused the secularization of the university, not in the sense that the university became explicitly nonreligious, but

\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\15-2\UST201.txt

294

unknown

Seq: 42

11-APR-19

UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL

14:19

[Vol. 15:2

The Catholic conception, however, adds a crucial element to academic
freedom within the university. It identifies one discipline that is architectonic to the entire academic enterprise: philosophy.239 Philosophy identifies
the relationship of the others disciplines to one another and polices the
boundaries of the various disciplines. Philosophy identifies the domain of
each discipline and its relative access to the truth. For example, philosophy
identifies that the discipline of biology governs organic life and cannot
make epistemically-warranted claims about the existence of God, the retrograde motion of Venus, or the causes of the Peloponnesian War. This role
of defining disciplinary boundaries was first worked out in medieval universities. Philosophy identified the respective boundaries of theology and
philosophy: theology’s domain was defined as those conclusions rationally
derived from revelation, whereas philosophy’s domain was those conclusions derived from human reason unaided by revelation.240
Because of its structuring of the disciplines, the Catholic conception of
the university entails a conception of academic freedom different from the
AAUP’s. We will describe this more fully in the next Part, but here, let us
note that academic freedom in a Catholic university may—not must—justify the identification of common premises and assumptions from which
that university’s scholarship, teaching, and debate begins.
In the 1940 Statement the AAUP does not identify, much less defend,
its conception of the university upon which its conception of academic freedom is premised. The AAUP’s conception of academic freedom is plausible
and widely shared, but it is not the only possible—and certainly not the
only reasonable—conception of academic freedom
B. The AAUP’s Conception of Academic Freedom is Internally
Incoherent
The AAUP’s conception of academic freedom is internally incoherent
because it declares that every idea must be subject to challenge and possible
refutation, while simultaneously cordoning-off certain ideas—in particular,
its conception of academic freedom—as unassailable and immune from
criticism. As such, it “inconsistently exempts itself from its own verdict
about all human thought.”241
The idea that the academic freedom of a scholar within a given discipline subsists in a neutral, unbounded openness of thought—a limitless horizon of intellectual pursuit without fixed markers, recognizable landmarks,
and defined boundaries—is fatuous. All thought, all inquiry, every theory
in the sense that there was now no organizing principle beyond the specialized disciplines, no
complete and unified vision of reality.”).
239. MACINTYRE, supra note 237 at 62–95.
240. See, e.g., I THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA q. 1, aa. 1–10.
241. LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 25 (1950) (commenting on historicism).
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and chain of reasoning, is non-neutral in the sense that it presupposes something; it must begin with something that is taken for granted.
The 1940 Statement declares that college and university professors
“are entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication of results”
and to “freedom in the classroom in discussing their subject.”242 The 1940
Statement argues that these freedoms are necessary because “[i]nstitutions
of higher education are conducted for the common good” and “[t]he common good depends upon the free search for truth and its free exposition.”243
The conception of academic freedom set forth in the 1940 Statement is
notable for three characteristics: first, the goal of academic inquiry is
“truth”; second, the pursuit of truth must take place in an atmosphere of
“full freedom,” uninhibited by the restraints that others would impose. The
only restraints on inquiry that should be operative are those voluntarily assumed by the scholar engaged in research within his or her discipline. Implicit within these notions of truth and freedom is a third characteristic,
namely, the idea that the scholarly process is a neutral enterprise. That is,
not only is the individual scholar impartial in conducting his or her research
and indifferent to the results attained, but the methods employed in the inquiry do not prejudge or predetermine the conclusions that he or she will
reach.
When these qualities of truth, freedom, and neutrality are examined in
detail, however, one discovers that the conception of academic freedom
championed by the AAUP is, at its root, internally incoherent. Indeed, the
notions of truth, freedom, and neutrality that the 1940 Statement relies upon
contradict and undermine the very idea of academic freedom that these concepts are employed to defend. In short, the purportedly unbounded academic freedom championed in the 1940 Statement is dependent upon
specific beliefs about the nature of truth, freedom, neutrality, and the common good that the 1940 Statement necessarily regards as fixed and
unassailable.
This same point can be seen from a slightly different perspective. Conceptually, under the 1940 Statement, does the modern university actually
stand for something? Does it embody any substantive commitments? Its
defenders might argue “Yes! It stands for truth and a fearless and unbiased
commitment to the pursuit of truth!” But this claim is confused because it
cannot be squared with the premises underlying the 1940 Statement.
Under the conception of academic freedom advanced by the AAUP,
every idea, concept, premise, and theory should be open to critique and
refutation. There are no sacred cows in the modern university, no privileged
points of view that are exempt from doubt and questioning. But this means
that the undefined idea of “truth” that supposedly animates and defines the
242. 1940 Statement, supra note 33, at 14.
243. Id.
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modern university and academic freedom is itself subject to critique and
refutation.
That is, there are different notions as to what “truth” is, differing conceptions competing within the modern university where everything is open
to question (e.g., correspondence theory, coherence theory, semantic theory,
pragmatist theory, deflationary theory, etc.)244 and among these, the correspondence theory of truth enjoys no privileged position. Yet the appeal of
the claim that the modern university stands for “the free search for truth and
its free exposition”245 hinges upon a particular conception of truth that, by
the logic of the principle of academic freedom, must be subject to critique
and refutation. Moreover, this conception of truth, upon which the appeal of
the modern university and academic freedom itself depend, is unarticulated;
it is tacit and assumed. That is, the champions of the AAUP’s 1940 Statement are banking on the idea that the individuals they are trying to persuade
will assume that “truth” means the correspondence theory of truth. As such,
in practice, this theory of truth enjoys a privileged position. It is not open to
question by those who champion the AAUP’s conception of academic freedom. In doing so, they contradict the very theory of academic freedom they
seek to defend.
The same criticism holds for the other terms that the 1940 Statement
employs: freedom and the common good. These are contested concepts,246
but the 1940 Statement seeks to persuade the public to support the principle
of academic freedom not by pointing to their contested nature but by appealing to a fixed understanding that the public embraces.
Isaiah Berlin’s seminal essay, Two Concepts of Liberty, provides an
especially prominent example of a “contested concept” in the realm of legal
and political theory. In the essay Berlin argues that there are two basic ways
of conceiving of human freedom.247 “Negative liberty” refers to the absence
of restraint. According to this conception, one is “free to the degree to
which no man or body of men interferes with my activity.”248 “If I am
prevented by others from doing what I could otherwise do, I am to that
degree unfree.”249 This conception of liberty is “liberty from; [the] absence
of interference beyond the shifting but always recognizable frontier.”250
“Positive liberty,” by contrast, is “not freedom from, but freedom to—to
lead one prescribed form of life.”251 It is the freedom to realize some
greater good by submitting to a truth and, in so doing, realize one’s “higher
244.
245.
246.
(1956).
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

See, e.g., ALEXIS G. BURGESS & JOHN P. BURGESS, TRUTH (2011).
1940 Statement, supra note 33, at 14.
W. B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 167
ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in LIBERTY 166 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002).
Id. at 169.
Id.
Id. at 174.
Id. at 178.
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nature,” one’s “true self.”252 The “positive doctrine of liberation by reason”
holds that a person is free when his actions are rational, when they “conform[ ] to the necessities of things.”253
Berlin notes that the first conception of freedom is the freedom of
classical liberalism—the freedom to be left alone. The second conception of
freedom includes the freedom of the great utopian political movements of
the twentieth century: Fascism and Communism.254 Which conception of
freedom is correct should, according to the principle of academic freedom
embodied in the 1940 Statement, be open to endless debate and disputation.
Yet the 1940 Statement champions the first conception and repudiates the
second. As Berlin keenly observes, different “conceptions of freedom directly derive from views of what constitutes a self, a person, a man.”255
Thus, a particular understanding of freedom entails a particular understanding of man, a philosophical anthropology—a theory about what it means to
be a human being. Thus, not only is the notion of academic freedom set
forth in the 1940 Statement dependent on a particular conception of freedom, but this conception of freedom is in turn covertly dependent upon a
particular anthropology, neither of which is thought to be subject to refutation as the principle of academic freedom proposes.
In sum, the current formulation of academic freedom, which prescribes
an absolute openness to the entertainment of all ideas, methods, and forms
of reasoning, and which foreswears the use of any concept, method, or logic
as essential to the academic enterprise, is itself dependent upon a set of
fixed and unassailable ideas and forms of reasoning.
If this were not the case, then the proposition “[h]uman beings are
capable of rational thought” should be subject to such inquiry. Indeed, according to the 1940 Statement, this claim should not, in principle, be immune from critique and possible rejection. Yet it is difficult to conceive
how one would go about proving that human beings are incapable of rational thought other than by making use of rational thought itself. As G.K.
Chesterton remarked, commenting on the same idea: “There is a thought
that stops thought. That is the only thought that ought to be stopped.”256
The fact that academic inquiry is dependent upon certain fixed and
unassailable beliefs, and that the very notion of academic freedom trades
upon these kinds of ideas, raises a critical question: Why do the champions
of academic freedom single out religious beliefs for special—that is, negative—treatment? If all academic inquiry proceeds upon the assumption that
certain beliefs are true, then why are religious institutions that promote an
252. Id. at 179.
253. BERLIN, supra note 247, at 190.
254. Id. at 190–91; see also PAUL JOHNSON, MODERN TIMES: THE WORLD FROM
TIES TO THE NINETIES (rev. ed. 1991).
255. BERLIN, supra note 247, at 181.
256. GILBERT K. CHESTERTON, ORTHODOXY 33 (Image Books 1959) (1908).

THE

TWEN-
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academic culture that expressly recognizes this dependence regarded as pariahs and threatened with being denied their due recognition as “real”
universities?
The mind of every academic tightly clenches some set of unprovable
dogmas, yet only religious dogmas are regarded as somehow obnoxious to
the academic enterprise. Now, it may be the case that unassailable religious
convictions are somehow different from other sorts of unassailable beliefs.
But proof of this claim would require some substantial argument, not the
categorical dismissal offered by the AAUP.257 Absent such argument
(which, according to the 1940 Statement, would itself be open to challenge
and refutation), the different treatment accorded religious beliefs speaks of
a kind of unprincipled distinction. Indeed, this inconsistency reveals the
version of academic freedom promoted by the AAUP not as a principle of
open mindedness and liberal neutrality for the conduct of scholarly inquiry,
nor as a constituent rule for the organization of a “real” university, but as an
ideology, the purpose of which is, at least in part, to shame and disparage
those religious colleges and universities that seek to have their intellectual
lives informed by the faith traditions they hold dear.
This is not to say that some robust version of the principle of academic
freedom does not have a place in any institution that wishes to be considered a university. Surely it does. But such a principle must be explicated
and defended on more nuanced and coherent grounds than what has been
offered in the past by the AAUP.
A more elaborate exposition of the self-contradictory nature of academic freedom as defined by the 1940 Statement can be found elsewhere.
Here, we focus on three sources that fill out this critique: the section on
academic freedom in the Founding Document of Thomas Aquinas College,
and David Schindler’s and Alvin Plantinga’s commentaries on the liberal
model of the university.
1. The Critique of Academic Freedom in the Founding Document
of Thomas Aquinas College
Thomas Aquinas College is a four-year, liberal arts, Catholic college
with a Great Books curriculum located in Santa Paula, California. The College was founded in 1970 when Ronald McArthur and several other faculty
left St. Mary’s College, located outside of Oakland.
The Thomas Aquinas College Founding Document sets forth a cogent
and sharply pointed critique of the concept of academic freedom as it is
conventionally understood. The Founding Document begins by noting that
“intellectual freedom is customarily defined by the mentality of free inquiry, the mentality which sees itself as not enslaved to any fixed conception but free to subject every doctrine to critical examination and possible
257. See Kilgore, supra note 40, at 369 and accompanying text.
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rejection.”258 The AAUP’s stance on academic freedom typifies this perspective, and the AAUP regards religious doctrine at a religious college or
university as a source of “institutional limitations” on academic freedom.259
The Founding Document responds to this conception of academic freedom with a number of trenchant criticisms. First, it makes clear that the
logic of academic freedom as an absolute ideal of free inquiry is untenable.
When academic freedom is proposed in this fashion, it must either be regarded as a dogma that is “immune to criticism,” or as merely one idea
among the universe of ideas that may be criticized and rejected through the
process of free inquiry.260 But the principle of free inquiry cannot justify its
own exemption from the scrutiny it urges on other ideas, nor can it justify
its own examination, precisely because free inquiry is the principle that “is
presently under judgment and therefore [is held] in suspense.”261
Second, the Founding Document notes that, according to the AAUP,
academic freedom’s underlying rationale is service of “the common good,”
and “[t]he common good depends upon the free search for truth and its free
exposition.”262 Indeed, the 1940 Statement insists that “[f]reedom in research is fundamental to the advancement of truth.”263 The idea is that
“[m]ore truths will be discovered, and more surely held . . . if all beliefs are
subject to question and possible reversal.”264 But, the only way in which
one could show that the principle of academic freedom had in fact contributed to the common good by arriving at some truth would be to treat the
conclusions reached as securely held and immune from further questioning.
However, the principle of free inquiry itself requires that such beliefs be
held provisionally, and subject to refutation. Thus, “the principle of free
inquiry would be nullified by the achievement of its stated purpose.”265
Third, the Founding Document acknowledges that a defender of the
principle of academic freedom as free inquiry might seek to avoid this contradiction by positing that true knowledge “is simply unattainable.”266 But,
this move does not avoid the contradiction of simultaneously holding that
everything is subject to refutation and rejection, and that certain things may
be regarded as true and not subject to rejection. This move is only an attempt to obscure a contradiction that cannot be avoided. This is because
preserving the idea of free inquiry by denying the possibility of attaining
258. A Proposal for the Fulfillment of Catholic Liberal Education, THOMAS AQUINAS C. 1, 19
(1969), https://thomasaquinas.edu/sites/default/files/a-proposal-forthe-fulfillment-of-catholic-edu
cation.pdf.
259. Id. (citing the 1967 Report, Kilgore, supra note 40).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. 1940 Statement, supra note 33, at 14.
263. Id.
264. A Proposal for the Fulfillment of Catholic Liberal Education, supra note 258, at 20.
265. Id.
266. Id.
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true knowledge would, as before, base the principle of free inquiry on a set
of “particular and controversial philosophical theories, which as a consequence would be immune to criticism under the principle.”267
Fourth, the Founding Document notes that every criticism, every line
of thought, “must finally be based on premises not subject to criticism.”268
This must be the case because
[I]f the premises of some criticism are themselves to be criticized,
and the premises of this second criticism are in turn to be criticized, and so on, then either the process must rest on premises not
subject to criticism, or all criticism is a game which begins anywhere and ends nowhere, advancing not a step towards the
truth.269
Fifth, and finally, the Founding Document observes that, paradoxically, academic freedom understood as free inquiry eviscerates the idea of
professional competence, and indeed the very concept of an academic discipline.270 Normally, competence is understood to refer to a scholar’s mastery
of a given subject matter. A competent scholar within a discipline knows
not only the methods of inquiry employed within his or her field but also
the widespread substantive beliefs within it that function as standards of
judgment. Yet academic freedom, understood as the principle of free inquiry, is supposed to govern decisions concerning the award of academic
tenure. According to the principle of academic freedom, a “competent”
scholar in a given discipline harbors no beliefs about what is true. Rather,
such a scholar regards everything as subject to free inquiry and possible
refutation. Thus, “competence” is no longer a matter of substantive knowledge within a given field and is instead a kind of bare abstraction.
It turns out, however, that scholars must apply standards that are more
than bare abstractions when assessing the professional standing of their colleagues. In practice, they “fall back upon ‘accepted standards’ of competence.”271 These accepted standards must either be so vague and general “as
to be nearly useless as directives,” or they must “carry in disguise definite
views of the true and the false in various disciplines.”272 Of course, concealed beliefs that cannot be questioned contradict the principle of free inquiry in the same way that conspicuous beliefs do. In either case, the logic
of academic freedom as the ideal of free inquiry again proves to be untenable: one cannot simultaneously hold: (1) that certain beliefs are true and that
those beliefs function as the foundation of knowledge in a given field such
that they cannot be subject to challenge and rejection, and (2) that in order
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

Id.
Id.
Id.
A Proposal for the Fulfillment of Catholic Liberal Education, supra note 258, at 20.
Id.
Id.
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to be a true scholar, one must suspend one’s belief as to the truth of any
given proposition and subject it to challenge and possible rejection.
Perhaps even worse is that the “accepted standards” of a given academic discipline are treated as authoritative and enforced only because they
are accepted, not because they are true. The scholar is not free to pursue the
truth as such; freedom yields to the despotism of convention. Here, the full
paradox of so-called “academic freedom” reveals itself: “the consistent application of academic freedom becomes by definition the very tyranny
which it is supposed to prevent.”273 Thus, in the absence of truth firmly
held, “academic freedom” does not celebrate freedom, notwithstanding its
name. Instead it demands conformity to a standard that is arbitrary—a matter of mere unexamined custom.
2. David Schindler’s and Alvin Plantinga’s Critiques of Liberal
Inquiry in the Modern Academy
In his book, Heart of the World, Center of the Church, David Schindler offers an interpretation of the Church and the Christian mission in the
world in light of the communio ecclesiology of the Second Vatican Council
and the pontificate of John Paul II. This communio ecclesiology “brings
with it a distinctive sense of the world as imago Dei: man, and in a certain
sense, all of cosmic being are created in the image of the concrete trinitarian
God manifest in Jesus Christ” such that “being receives its basic order and
meaning from love.” From this perspective, all of existence “from its beginning is ordered to, and invited in true analogous ways to share in, the communio whose reality in history is the Church.”274
Schindler develops this thesis in a critique of what he calls “Catholic
liberalism.”275 By this term he does not refer to an assortment of commonly
voiced positions on matters of controversy within the Church: a rejection of
Humanae Vitae, support for the ordination of women, intercommunion with
people of other faiths, and the incorporation of liturgical dance as an accepted part of the Novos Ordo. While those on the Catholic left are known
to favor such positions, Schindler instead has in mind “the Catholic version
of liberalism often termed ‘neoconservatism.’”276 This “Catholic liberalism” assumes that “the Catholic Church at the Second Vatican Council,
especially in Gaudium et Spes and Dignitatis Humanae, made its peace
with Western political liberalism,” and that a similar peace with economic
liberalism was reached in John Paul II’s encyclical Centesimus Annus.277
273. Id.
274. DAVID L. SCHINDLER, HEART OF THE WORLD, CENTER
clesiology, Liberalism, and Liberation, at xi (1996).
275. Id. at xiv.
276. Id. at 31.
277. Id. at 32.

OF THE
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The defining feature of each of these varieties of liberalism is freedom,
mediated through institutions that are purportedly non-ideological in nature.
Put another way, the freedom that liberalism promises is an “empty freedom,” “purely formal,” and “‘neutral’ with respect to the contents of all
possible choices (or worldviews).”278 The gist of Schindler’s critique is that
the invitation to embrace this allegedly purely formal and neutral view of
freedom is a “con game” precisely because liberalism “already embodies a
definite, though hidden, conception of human nature and destiny.”279 Moreover, those Catholic thinkers who have “defended the coupling of Catholicism with American liberal institutions”—in politics, economics, and
academia—“have imparted—however unconsciously—a liberal worldview
that always-already prevents the arrival of . . . the worldview proper to a
communio theology.”280
The non-neutral quality of liberal freedom that Schindler describes can
be found in the heart of the modern secular university. Schindler notes that,
through the work of Note Dame president Theodore M. Hesburgh, C.S.C.,
and others, the secular university became the defining model for Catholic
institutions of higher learning. According to Father Hesburgh, a Catholic
university “must be ‘first and foremost a university.’”281 If this is not the
case, the institution that the word “Catholic” describes may be many things,
“but not a university.”282 If the Church wants to enter the academic world,
says Hesburgh, “the reality and the terms of this world are well established
and must be observed.”283
This way of framing the issue, however, presupposes that there is such
a thing as a “university” in pristine form, pure and unadorned—an idea that
precedes any particular instantiation.284 Moreover, it presupposes that the
standards of rationality and methods of inquiry employed by such a university in the academic enterprise are neutral with respect to the content of the
conclusions reached. By contrast, Schindler contends “that the critical
methods and scholarship of the contemporary academy do not embody a
278. Id. at 36.
279. Id. at 34.
280. SCHINDLER, supra note 274, at 35–36.
281. Id. at 143 (citing Theodore M. Hesburgh, C.S.C., Introduction: The Challenge and Promise of a Catholic University, in THE CHALLENGE AND PROMISE OF A CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY 4
(Theodore M. Hesburgh C.S.C. ed., 1994). Schindler slightly misquotes Hesburgh. The complete
sentence from Hesburgh’s introduction to the book correctly reads as follows: “One may add
descriptive adjectives to this or that university, calling it public or private, Catholic or Protestant,
British or American, but the university must first and foremost be a university, or else the thing
that the qualifiers qualify is something, but not a university.”
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. See Richard J. Neuhaus, The Christian University: Eleven Theses, FIRST THINGS, Jan.
1996, at 20 (arguing that “[t]here is no such thing as a university pure and simple” and that “[a]
secular university is not a university pure and simple; it is a secular university. Secular is not a
synonym for neutral.”).
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pure rationality: they are not neutral relative to competing worldviews.”285
Further, this non-neutrality “does not mean merely that mainstream contemporary universities often carry an ethos opposed to Catholicism on certain
moral-social questions concerning the marginalization of the poor, abortion,
gender, family, and the like.”286 Rather, “[t]he non-neutrality of the contemporary university toward . . . an authentically Catholic worldview lies already within the nature of its disciplines.”287
More precisely, the modern university is a manifestation of “liberalism” which Schindler says “embodies above all the claim of neutrality.”
As operative in the university, this neutrality
[S]tands for a certain priority of method over content: it stands
more for a way of approaching issues than for a definite outcome.
Indeed, that is just the point: the critical methods of the academy,
on a liberal reading, claim openness as their hallmark. Their precise intention is to avoid any a priori assumption of content
which would, ipso facto, prejudice the (putative) pure openness of
methods.288
The claim is that the university practices an “authentic rationality” that is
pure “because it is, a priori, empty of any substantive content.” This pure
rationality “affords the utmost in freedom, because no substantive content is
imposed upon it in advance of the unfolding of its formal procedures.”289
The problem with liberalism as the mode of operation and animating
spirit of the university, says Schindler,
[I]s that there are no instances of purely formal, hence neutral,
methodological procedures, in the way claimed by liberalism:
that, on the contrary, all methodological procedures, insofar as
they claim to mean anything at all . . . imply and thus are shaped
internally (if often tacitly) by metaphysical and theological
presuppositions.290
According to Schindler, the worldviews that inform the scholarship and
critical methods of the contemporary university are: (1) “mechanism”—a
philosophy that limits reality to the purely material thereby denying the
possibility of genuine immanence and the existence of formal and final
causes, and (2) “subjectivism”—a philosophy that contends that reality is
not mind independent, but instead regards the categories and structures of
reality as constructs of the human mind.
Schindler concludes that these worldviews are incompatible with the
worldview that should inform a Catholic university. That is, because the
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

SCHINDLER, supra note 274, at 145.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 153.
Id.
Id. at 154.
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modern university today employs an understanding of rationality that is not
neutral, because it uses a methodology that is not purely formal, because
these substantive perspectives on the nature of the human person and reality
as a whole inform the modern academic enterprise, a Catholic university
cannot look to such a university as a model for how to proceed as an institution. Instead, what must identify “a Catholic institution as a university” is
that it must think with “a Catholic mind.”291
Liberalism, then, is not neutral but contains within it presuppositions
about the nature of reality and the nature of the human capacity to know
that reality. The principle of academic freedom as embodied in the modern
university is the contemporary expression of liberalism par excellence.
Thus, a Catholic university should promote a conception of academic freedom that avoids the liberal conceit of neutrality and reflects instead the
metaphysical commitments of a Catholic worldview.
Alvin Plantinga, a philosopher whom Schindler cites, makes the point
even more clearly. Plantinga identifies “three fundamental perspectives or
ways of thinking about what the world is like, what we ourselves are like,
what is most important about the world, what our place in it is, and what we
must do to live the good life.”292 The first perspective Plantinga identifies is
“Christianity, or Christian theism, or Judeo-Christian theism.” The other
two perspectives he identifies are “perennial naturalism” (which corresponds to Schindler’s “mechanism”) and “creative antirealism” (which corresponds to Schindler’s “subjectivism”).
Perennial naturalism holds that “there is no God, and we human beings
are insignificant parts of a giant cosmic machine that proceeds in majestic
indifference to our hopes and aspirations, our needs and desires, our sense
of fairness or fittingness.”293 The form this perspective assumes in culture
and in the modern university “is broadly evolutionary” in that we “try to
understand basic human phenomena by way of their origin in random genetic mutation, or some other source of variability, and their perpetuation
by way of natural selection.”294 From this perspective, all of human phenomena—including science, art, literature, music, mathematics, philosophy,
and religion—are “to be seen as arising, finally, by way of the mechanisms
driving evolution and are to be understood in terms of their place in evolutionary history, in terms of their contribution to present or past fitness.”295

291. SCHINDLER, supra note 274, at 147.
292. Alvin Plantinga, On Christian Scholarship, in THE CHALLENGE AND PROMISE OF A CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY 267, 269 (Theodore M. Hesburgh ed. 1994).
293. Id.
294. Id. at 270. For a book length critique of the philosophy of materialism in light of modern
physics, see STEPHEN M. BARR, MODERN PHYSICS AND ANCIENT FAITH (2003).
295. Plantinga, supra note 292, at 271.
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Creative antirealism, by contrast, posits that “it is we ourselves—we
human beings—who are responsible for the basic structure of the world.”296
Whereas Schindler traces what he calls “subjectivism” back to Descartes,
Plantinga traces “creative antirealism” back to Kant. According to this
view, “[s]uch fundamental structures of the world such as those of time and
space, object and property, number, truth and falsehood, possibility and necessity, and even existence and nonexistence” are not “found in the world
as such . . . but are somehow constituted by our own mental or conceptual
activity.”297
These perspectives, says Plantinga, are “seductive” and “widespread.”298 “We live in a world dominated by them; we imbibe them with
our mother’s milk.”299 Yet “these perspectives are also deeply inimical to
Christianity; these ways of thinking distort our views of ourselves and the
world.”300 These non-neutral perspectives deeply influence the way in
which academics teach courses, conduct research, and formulate conclusions in their particular disciplines. Yet the only perspectives that are singled out by the 1940 Statement as being inimical to academic freedom are
religious perspectives. Plantinga rejects this prejudice and challenges Christian scholars not to be cowed into “trying to understand things from a naturalistic perspective” but to “pursue these disciplines from a specifically
Christian perspective.”301
III.

THE AAUP CONCEPTION OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM
WITH UNIVERSITY PRACTICES

IS

INCONSISTENT

The fulsome conception of academic freedom reflected in the AAUP’s
1940 Statement would seem to welcome a wide variety of perspectives, not
only across disciplines, but within disciplines. Moreover, given that this
conception of academic freedom is the norm in American higher education,
one would expect university faculties to be communities of enormous intellectual diversity. The actual practice of academic freedom in American universities (private and public, secular and religious), however, indicates that
few people actually believe in this version of the principle. These contrary
practices, when coupled with the disparagement of religious universities
that follow a different conception of academic freedom, suggest that the
1940 Statement is not so much the articulation of a foundational principle of
academic life as an ideology that serves ends other than those it purports to
advance.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

Id. at 269–70.
Id. at 273.
Id. at 291.
Id.
Id.
Plantinga, supra note 292, at 293.
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On its face, the 1940 AAUP definition of academic freedom protects
teaching, research, and public advocacy without any significant restraints.
Given the AAUP’s very broad conception of academic freedom, to which
nearly all American universities adhere, one would expect that teaching,
scholarship, and debate are unlimited, or nearly so. In practice, however,
few if any universities allow their faculty members to engage in unrestrained teaching, unbounded research, and limitless debate. Contrary to the
near absolutist vision of academic freedom in the 1940 Statement, faculty
members are subject to numerous restrictions in university life. Some of
these restrictions reflect commonplace—and reasonable—judgments made
by academic institutions on the best ways to pursue research, while others
do not.
University life today is marked by an exclusion of certain points of
view that is both surreptitious and in plain sight. Notwithstanding the
claimed openness to different voices on university campuses, academic institutions and faculties embody significant restrictions on the points of view
they are willing to consider and seek to advance: university speech codes,
outside speaker policies, the demarcation of so-called “safe spaces,” and the
restriction of free speech to certain confined locations on campus.302 Although those restrictions on speech are important, the more significant exclusion of voices that we have in mind relates not to outsiders. Rather, it
concerns the decision as to who will become an insider—who will become
a faculty member.
The primary way in which restrictions on different points of view are
enforced in academia (to the point where these restrictions become sewn
into the fabric of institutions) is through the appointments process. Here,
faculty members tend to replicate themselves, selecting new teachers and
scholars who not only agree with them with respect to the most contentious
issues in their given disciplines, but who largely mirror existing faculty
members culturally and politically. What largely passes for diversity—indeed what is celebrated as the achievement of diversity—namely, the composition of a faculty marked by differences in race and gender—pays little
to no attention to true intellectual diversity.303
Moreover, the AAUP clearly tolerates universities and faculties that
work to exclude certain points of view from finding a home within their
ranks. Faculties tend to replicate themselves. The new members who join, if
not exactly like the current faculty in every respect, resemble them in the
302. To be clear, this is a problem that long precedes the current episodes making headlines on
campuses from Yale to Berkeley, Middlebury to Missouri, Claremont-McKenna to Evergreen
State, often involving intimidation and even the use of violence. Those episodes were largely
student-driven protests directed at outside speakers. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, SPEAK FREELY:
WHY UNIVERSITIES MUST DEFEND FREE SPEECH (2018); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & HOWARD GILLMAN, FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS (2017).
303. See James Lindgren, Measuring Diversity: Law Faculties in 1997 and 2013, 39 HARV.
J.L. & PUBL. POL’Y 89 (2016) (describing the lack of intellectual diversity on law faculties).
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views they hold within certain well-defined parameters of acceptability.
Which views are acceptable does not need to be made explicit in the interview process, and are not spelled out in any official way. They are tacitly
shared among individuals who received similar professional training and
often attended the same schools.304 Even when they come from different
parts of the country and different social and ethnic backgrounds, the candidates selected are thought to make a good “fit” with the existing faculty.
Generally speaking, this means that the faculty members within a given
academic unit do not hold wildly divergent views, either with respect to
their discipline305 or with respect to the norms of political society.
It is the common practice of faculties to privilege certain beliefs—
beliefs that they hold to be true but cannot prove (“priors”) but which are
treated as immune from criticism.306 Moreover, these unprovable prior beliefs are operative in academic communities in that faculties employ them
in the selection of their colleagues—where adherence to these same beliefs
is deemed to be a necessary qualification for appointment. More often than
not, however, these priors are employed in faculty selection in a covert
fashion.307 This selection process leads to an overwhelming sameness.308
Rather than a coat of many colors, university life is lived in a beige room,
with beige walls, beige carpeting, beige furniture, and beige curtains that
filter the room in beige light.
The AAUP accepts this kind of placid uniformity—this stifling of diverse opinions—in the academy. Yet, it finds this uniformity unacceptable
when the uniformity is religious in nature—when a religiously affiliated
university hires faculty members to advance its religiously inspired mission.
The source of this disparate treatment is the view that religion is irrational,
anti-scientific, and anti-intellectual and, as such, has no place in the university—the temple of neutral reason.
304. Cf. Eugene H. Bramhall & Ronald Z. Ahrens, Academic Freedom and the Status of the
Religiously Affiliated University, 37 GONZ. L. REV. 227, 241 (2001–2002) (“Every school fosters
a climate hostile to certain ideas and amenable to others. Every workplace has within it a pressure
to conform to certain standards; the academic community is no exception.”). As Bramhall and
Ahrens note, “[f]ailure to comply with these unstated standards” can lead to the denial of career
opportunities, and as such constitute a denial of academic freedom. Id.
305. Faculty members within a department may reflect some measure of diversity in that they
may possess some special expertise within a sub-specialty of the discipline.
306. To be clear, our claim here is not that one should not believe what one cannot prove. One
may have good and sound reasons to believe in the truth of propositions that fall short of proof.
307. Lindgren, supra note 303, at 128–35 (discussing the implications of the author’s description of law faculties’ lack of diversity and repeatedly noting the effect of hiring practices and
policies).
308. See, e.g., Mitchell Langbert, Homogeneous: The Political Affiliations of Elite Liberal
Arts College Faculty, NAT’L ASS’N OF SCHOLARS (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.nas.org/articles/
homogenous_political_affiliations_of_elite_liberal (sampling of 8,688 tenure track, PhD–holding
professors from fifty-one of the sixty-six top-ranked liberal arts colleges in the U.S. News 2017
report, and finding that the Democratic-to-Republican ratio across the sample was 10.4:1, and that
this ratio rose to 12.7:1 if two military colleges, West Point and Annapolis, were excluded).
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Despite the rhetoric of academic freedom—that faculty should enjoy
“full freedom in research and in the publication of the results” (1940 Statement), and that “the first condition of progress is complete and unlimited
freedom to pursue inquiry and publish its results” (1915 Declaration)—
restrictions on research at colleges and universities are commonplace.
Moreover, these restrictions often reflect ethical judgments made by the
institution—moral judgments that it imposes on its faculty and students regardless of their individual judgments to the contrary. Thus, for example,
universities commonly have policies limiting or even prohibiting research
on human subjects or animal subjects. Other restrictions include prohibitions on the use of nuclear materials, and policies that prohibit the use of
vendors who do not subscribe to fair trade rules or environmentally protective “green” standards.
Presumably, these kinds of restrictions would be countenanced by the
AAUP if notice were provided to the faculty member at the time of appointment. After all, the Limitations Clause recognizes that an institution may
limit academic freedom “because of religious or other aims” so long as they
are “clearly stated at the time of the appointment.”309 The issue would thus
appear to be a matter of fairness.310 Still, the singular focus of the Limitations Clause indicates that fairness in notice is not the AAUP’s real
concern.
Imagine that a non-religious university has a policy prohibiting experimentation on animal subjects, and a newly hired faculty member is alerted
to this restriction at the time of his appointment. Assume further that he
agrees with the policy but later changes his mind when he receives a grant
that will allow him to conduct animal research. When he engages in this
research the university seeks to dismiss the professor for violating the policy. Presumably, the AAUP would approve of such an action. Now imagine
that a person is hired at a religious school and is informed at the time of
appointment of the institution’s commitment to its religious identity, and
that this mission informs the institution’s approach to academic freedom.
Imagine further that the person subscribed to the school’s mission but later
changed his religious viewpoint and wrote scholarly articles against the
faith of the institution. Presumably the AAUP would object if the university
sought to dismiss the professor. What is not clear is what distinguishes the
two cases.
The AAUP’s continued and dogged rejection of religious or theological contours for academic freedom, while permitting other kinds of limits,
shows that something other than the pure pursuit of truth is operative. The
AAUP only finds uniformity unacceptable when the uniformity is religious
309. 1940 Statement, supra, note 33, at 14.
310. Put to one side, the observation that notice of such restrictions may not be provided at the
time of appointment, or is done so in the only the most cursory fashion (e.g. informing the new
hire to read the faculty handbook).
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in origin. On campuses that adhere to the 1940 Statement, widespread university practice has in fact undermined the stated goal of the AAUP’s conception of academic freedom by limiting the variety of perspectives that are
heard in the pursuit of truth. Given this fact, it is difficult to see how a
policy of academic freedom, formulated in light of a university’s religious
commitments, would be worse.
IV. A PRELIMINARY PRESCRIPTION FOR ACADEMIC FREEDOM
IN CATHOLIC UNIVERSITIES
In the preceding parts, we argued that the conception of academic freedom set forth in the AAUP’s 1940 Statement is internally incoherent: it
holds that every idea should be subject to searching criticism and possible
refutation, yet it exempts the idea of academic freedom itself (and the concepts upon which it depends—“freedom,” “truth,” and the “public good”)
from this same judgment. The 1940 Statement also suggests that a university’s religious worldview is peculiarly obnoxious to the academic enterprise, while leaving unchallenged other beliefs of a secular nature. As such,
we have argued that, in practice, the AAUP principle works not only to
preserve the integrity of the academic enterprise, but to achieve certain ideological ends.
That the principle of academic freedom set forth in the 1940 Statement
is flawed does not mean that academic freedom has no place on the campus
of a Catholic university. Here, we offer a still-tentative prescription for academic freedom in Catholic universities and the law schools they sponsor.
We believe that the conception of academic freedom offered here is broad
and capable of reasonably different instantiations. The practical challenge is
to navigate how Catholic universities, as communities of scholars, can remain faithful to the truth professed by the Church, while giving their faculty
members the freedom necessary to raise questions, conduct research, and
participate in the pertinent disciplinary conversation that is the essence of
the scholarly enterprise.
Normally, the arrangement between an employer and employee is a
matter of private contract. The law proscribes certain interactions between
contracting parties that are unconscionable or that are against public policy
and so may not be the subject of a bargained-for exchange.311 Beyond these
fairly well-defined areas of contract law, the parties are free to strike
whatever bargain they wish.
The claim made by the AAUP in the 1940 Statement is that the “public
good” demands that the particular formulation of academic freedom championed by the AAUP must have a place in the relationship between em311. These include racially-restrictive covenants and contracts to commit crimes. See, e.g.,
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §5 (3d ed. 1999); JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO
ON CONTRACTS §22 (6th ed. 2009).
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ployer and employee (university and professor) regardless of the specific
employment arrangement reached between the parties. The 1940 Statement
provides that if the institution wishes to be considered a “real” university it
must contractually relate to its faculty members in the way it prescribes. At
the same time, the AAUP concedes that free private ordering between a
university and its faculty member is legitimate. Indeed, the legitimacy of
this arrangement is expressly recognized in the Limitations Clause to the
1940 Statement and in the statements from the AAUP and AAC that preceded this language.312
Seen from a secularist perspective, academic freedom in a religiously
affiliated university is a problem of individual freedom pitted against a bureaucracy guided by religious dogma and bent on censorship. A secular
bureaucracy that wished to silence debate and squelch certain points of
view would be bad enough in its own right but, because religious dogma is
a matter of faith, it is not subject to the modes of argumentation and the
demands for evidence that apply in other areas of human inquiry.313 Religion is beyond the pale of rational scrutiny, and as such, has no place in the
academy, let alone in university administration.
Seen from a religious perspective, academic freedom in a religiously
affiliated university is quite different. It is the relationship of two legitimate
freedoms that are sometimes in tension with one another: the freedom of the
individual faculty member and the freedom of the institution. From the religious perspective, the individual faculty member should enjoy a wide freedom to teach, to conduct research, to publish, and to speak on matters of
public concern, but the individual should not possess the freedom to undermine the university’s mission of structured pursuit of the truth. And the
university should not be compelled to provide institutional support to points
of view that, in its judgment, would undermine the institution’s mission.
The AAUP 1940 Statement clearly favors the individual over the institution. That is, the individual faculty member—not the faculty as a whole or
the university as an institution—is the primary locus of the right of academic freedom. Indeed, in the estimation of the AAUP, insofar as the university enjoys institutional academic freedom, it is subordinate to the
academic freedom of each individual faculty member.314
312. For the historical antecedents to the Limitations Clause to the 1940 Statement, see Matthew W. Finkin et al., The “Limitations” Clause in the 1940 Statement of Principles, ACADEME,
Sept.–Oct. 1988, at 52.
313. For a recent book describing religion in this fashion, see BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE
RELIGION? 33–53 (2013).
314. There is some irony in this, given that, as it first arose in the medieval university, academic freedom was a communal ideal that set the university apart from the local bishop, not an
individual right that set the individual professor apart from the university. Jean Porter, Misplaced
Nostalgia: ‘Ex Corde’ & the Medieval University, 128 COMMONWEAL 12 (Apr. 20, 2001) (citing
HASTINGS RASHDALL, THE UNIVERSITIES OF EUROPE IN THE MIDDLE AGES (Frederick M. Powicke
& Alfred B. Emden eds., 1936)).
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Conceiving of the relationship in this fashion renders faculty members
as independent contractors rather than as members of a community of
scholars together pursuing the truth. Viewed through the prism of the 1940
Statement, faculty members at a university do not really share anything in
common intellectually; they share a location and they share in the use of the
same campus facilities; they share in a brand and a source of income
(namely, the university as a business and going concern that generates revenue through tuition, grants, and interest on endowment); and they share the
students themselves. But according to the AAUP, they cannot share a set of
intellectual premises and presuppositions except through voluntary assent
that may be broken at any moment by any faculty member. The university
can do virtually nothing to maintain an intellectual community as such.
An alternative way to envision academic freedom is as something that
each faculty member possesses, but also as a member within the university
community. Indeed, historically, the origin of academic freedom is a collective, institutional freedom of non-interference by the state and the Church in
the affairs of the academic community.315
The Catholic conception of the university is drawn from the Catholic
intellectual tradition, and a Catholic university as such draws its intellectual
identity from this tradition.316 In this tradition, universities are rationally
structured communities of inquiry pursuing the truth. Catholic universities
possess three necessary characteristics: first, they engage in rational inquiry
in pursuit of the truth; second, they understand the truth as unitary such that
natural reason and religious faith—together and symbiotically—facilitate
inquiry into a greater understanding of reality; and third, they regard the
truth as objective—that it is independent of human cognition. In addition,
as noted above, historically in Catholic universities the discipline of philosophy has organized the other disciplines, identified their respective relationships, and policed their respective boundaries.
The Catholic conception of the university requires academic freedom.
Indeed, this freedom is necessary for faculty members to pursue the truth
within their respective disciplines, be it physics, history, or law. The Catholic conception of the university also entails a range of plausible conceptions
of academic freedom that differ from the AAUP version. For instance, in a
Catholic university, theology is a relevant discipline that produces epistemi315. FINKIN & POST, supra note 234, at 19–20.
316. Margret O’Brien Steinfels, The Catholic Intellectual Tradition (Aug. 3, 1995), in 1 OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON CATH. HIGHER ED. 3, 5 (1995) (“Catholic intellectual life is central to Catholic identity.”); Jude P. Dougherty et al., The Secularization of Western Culture and the Catholic
College and University, 2 CURRENT ISSUES IN CATH. HIGHER ED. 7 (1981) (“The Catholic tradition is an intellectual one. It created universities as part of its perennial endeavor to continue the
task of fides quaerens intellectum. It cannot confidently entrust to the modern non-Christian university the task of pursuing insight into the whole of what has been revealed. It cannot even be
sure that secular universities will preserve and hand on the full range of cultural fruits thus far
achieved by the Catholic tradition.”).
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cally-warranted claims, and it would be inconsistent with that conception of
a Catholic university to argue to the contrary.
The Catholic conception of a university does not prescribe a singular,
mandatory version of academic freedom. It is indeterminate on how a particular institution instantiates academic freedom because there are reasonably different ways of effectuating academic freedom within a Catholic
university. For instance, the fact that the Catholic conception of a university
gives theology pride-of-place does not necessarily require that claims that
contradict the Catholic faith be proscribed or treated one way rather than
another. We believe that a range of reasonable options are available. At one
extreme a Catholic university could adopt the AAUP standards in their entirety. At the other extreme a Catholic university could require a loyalty
oath with respect to religious belief.317 A Catholic university could adhere
to a number of reasonable alternatives between these two extremes such as
adopting a copious version of academic freedom similar to AAUP but with
certain narrowly construed limitations related to its religious mission, or by
seeking to ensure the university’s Catholic identity not by penalizing
faculty for the views expressed in their scholarly work following appointment, but by an exacting scrutiny of faculty candidates at the time of hiring.
Furthermore, there are potentially a wide variety of practical mechanisms that Catholic universities may utilize to protect and preserve their
particular instantiations of academic freedom. The consequences of violating a university’s policy on academic freedom could include: (i) dismissal
from the university,318 (ii) denial of financial support for the research or
written work, (iii) denial of credit toward tenure or promotion for the research or written work, or (iv) denial of the right to vote on faculty appointments, among many others.
Relatedly, different Catholic universities could reasonably choose to
structure their respective communities to provide different forms of academic freedom. Thomas Aquinas College structures academic freedom to
privilege central facets of the Catholic intellectual tradition, while the University of Notre Dame “maintains respect for individuals as persons, and
317. Loyalty oaths are still used at a number of Evangelical Protestant colleges, and a select
number of Catholic colleges. See, e.g., Statement of Faith and Educational Purpose, WHEATON
COLL. (Oct. 17, 1992), http://www.wheaton.edu/About-Wheaton/Statement-of-Faith-and-Educa
tional-Purpose (noting that the Statement of Faith is reaffirmed annually by the Wheaton College
Board of Trustees, faculty, and staff); Catholic Identity, CHRISTENDOM COLL., http://www.christen
dom.edu/about/catholic-identity/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2019) (noting that “[a]ll professors are Catholic and ALL of them make an Oath of Fidelity to the Magisterium and a Profession of Faith each
year in the presence of the Diocese of Arlington’s Bishop Michael Burbidge”). Loyalty oaths were
employed at public institutions of higher learning in the mid-twentieth century as a way of promoting American political values and combating Communism. See, e.g., Alexander Guerry,
Teachers’ Loyalty Oaths, 23 AAUP BULL. 229 (Mar. 1937).
318. Cf. Daniel Golden, A Test of Faith, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 7, 2006, 12:01 AM), https://www
.wsj.com/articles/SB113659805227040466 (recounting how Wheaton College fired a philosophy
professor, Joshua Hochschild, after he converted to Catholicism).
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lives in the tradition of Christian belief,” but allows for criticism of that
belief.319
At this point, we do not have a firm view as to the best manner of
effectuating the boundaries of academic freedom in the context of a Catholic university.
V. CONCLUSION
Catholic higher education in the United States has struggled with reconciling academic freedom and its commitment to participate in the
Church’s mission. Although most Catholic universities have adopted the
AAUP conception of academic freedom, it is inherently incoherent. Moreover, the AAUP conception is not the only one available. There are other
reasonable conceptions of academic freedom, including conceptions that
follow from the Catholic conception of university life. Catholic universities
may instantiate academic freedom in a variety of reasonable manners. They
should not slavishly adhere to the AAUP.

319. UNIV. OF NOTRE DAME, ACADEMIC ARTICLES 11, art. III, § 2 (2017), https://facultyhand
book.nd.edu/assets/276034/academic_articles_effective_october_1_2017.pdf. See also Mission
Statement, U. OF NOTRE DAME, https://www.nd.edu/about/mission-statement/ (last visited Mar. 7,
2019) (“What the University asks of all its scholars and students, however, is not a particular
creedal affiliation, but a respect for the objectives of Notre Dame and a willingness to enter into
the conversation that gives it life and character. Therefore, the University insists upon academic
freedom that makes open discussion and inquiry possible.”).
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APPENDIX
I.

LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO

The 1962 Faculty Handbook for Loyola University Chicago provided as
follows:
The primary purpose of education is the free and unhampered
communication of truth. Every teacher, therefore, in virtue of his
office has not only the right but the duty to participate freely in
the search for and the communication of truth. Academic freedom
to discover and teach the truth is guaranteed to the teacher; freedom of learning is guaranteed to the student.
Truth, however, being the perceived relationship of the conformity between the mind and its object, must be understood to be its
objective. The knower perceives the truth; he does not produce it.
It follows that personal sincerity or even subjective conviction is
not a criterion of truth or a safeguard against error.
It must be noted that truth is not restricted to positive and experimentally demonstrable physical facts. Over and above the truths
which can be arrived at by the use of natural powers, there are
other truths which God has revealed and which are even more
certain since they are evidenced by the authority of God Himself.
As there can be only one objective truth and as reason and revelation are merely two different paths to truth, whatever is learned
by one method cannot be in contradiction to what is learned by
another. Any opposition is merely apparent. No teacher therefore
should ever teach anything that contradicts certain truth, whether
that truth be known to him from its own evidence, from reliable
human authority, or from the Catholic Church speaking within its
legitimate scope.
Academic freedom, consequently implies not only rights but correlative duties. As a Catholic institution of higher learning Loyola
expects all its faculties to exercise their right of academic freedom without teaching anything that violates doctrines of faith or
morals of the Catholic Church.
As an American institution it expects all to exercise their right
without teaching anything that is contrary to the principles of
American government as set forth in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States.
Any grave offense against these canons shall be considered just
cause for dismissal from the Loyola faculty.
The teacher is entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication of its results, subject to the adequate performance of his
other academic duties; but research on other activities for pecuni-
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ary return should be based upon an understanding with the
University.
The teacher, as a citizen, is free from institutional censorship or
discipline, but his special position in the community imposes special obligations. As a man of learning and an educational officer,
he should remember that the public may judge his profession and
his institution by his utterances. Hence he should at all times be
accurate, should exercise appropriate restraint, should show respect for the opinions of others, and should make every effort to
indicate that he is not an institutional spokesman.
When speaking or writing especially in controversial matters,
members of the faculty should state explicitly that their viewpoints do not necessarily reflect the attitude of the University
authorities.320
The statement on academic freedom in Loyola’s 2015 Faculty Handbook provides as follows:
Academic freedom guarantees that the university shall not
abridge the right of faculty to speak, write, teach, create art and
conduct research. All faculty have the right and the duty to participate freely in the search for and the expression of knowledge
and truth. It is the policy of Loyola to protect and encourage the
academic freedom of all faculty, and to protect faculty members
from pressure or influence that would restrict their academic
freedom.
Loyola faculty are entitled to freedom in research/scholarship (including artistic accomplishment) and in the publication of the results. They are also entitled to freedom in the classroom in
discussing the subject matter of the course, but should avoid persistently interjecting material that has no relation to the subject
matter. Although a faculty member is free from institutional censorship or discipline in the exercise of his or her academic freedom, membership on the faculty at Loyola imposes certain
obligations. As an educator and person of learning, a member of
the faculty should strive at all times to be accurate, exercise appropriate restraint and judgment, foster and defend intellectual
honesty and freedom of inquiry, show respect for the rights of
others to express divergent ideas and opinions, and refrain from
claiming to be an official spokesperson for the University.
Academic tenure helps sustain academic freedom. It contributes
to the recruitment and retention of outstanding faculty and works
to ensure excellence in the quality of Loyola’s educational and
research programs. The principles of academic freedom apply to
church-related institutions of higher learning, such as Loyola,
320. 1962 FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra note 169, at 20–21.
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which take into consideration the authoritative teaching and tradition of the church to which the institution is related (in the case of
Loyola, the Roman Catholic Church).321
II.

CREIGHTON UNIVERSITY

Today, Creighton University has a policy on academic freedom much
like the policy at most other universities. It states in part:
Creighton University recognizes that its faculty is entitled to enjoy and exercise, without penalty or fear of reprisal, all the rights
of American citizens, and to seek the truth and to state the truth as
the faculty member sees it for the advancement of knowledge and
the free pursuit of learning by their students.
Freedom in research is fundamental to the advancement of truth.
The faculty member is entitled to freedom in research and in the
publication of the results, subject to the adequate performance of
other academic duties.322
It used to be the case, however, that Creighton’s Faculty Handbook
was quite different in that it contained a “Credo of Creighton.” A revised
version of the statement is still available on the University’s website.323
First drafted in 1942, the “Credo” was revised in 1974 and again in 1993. In
its original form, the “Credo of Creighton” contained an important statement on academic freedom: “The Creighton University refuses to subscribe
to the doctrine that ‘academic freedom’ may be used as a pretext to teach
systems which destroy all freedom. We proudly boast that it has always
taught and always will teach the following creed . . . .” The “Creed” that
that Creighton set forth was more elaborate from 1942 to 1974 than it was
in the decades that followed. The earlier version stated: “We believe in
God. We believe in the natural right of private property . . . . We believe . . .
in the teachings of Christ, who held that morality must regulate the personal, family, economic and international life of men if civilization is to
endure.”
The current version of the “Credo” testifies to the University’s Christian, if not specifically Catholic mission and identity. The “Credo” expresses belief in “God, our loving Creator and Father” and in “the teachings
and example of Jesus Christ.”324 But the current version of “Credo of
321. 2015 FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra note 199, at 34. This is the ninth edition of Loyola’s
Faculty Handbook.
322. CREIGHTON UNIV., FACULTY HANDBOOK 1, 33 (2016), http://typo3.creighton.edu/filead
min/user/GeneralCounsel/docs/Faculty_Handbook_2017__complete_.pdf.
323. Credo of Creighton, CREIGHTON U., https://www.alumni.creighton.edu/s/1250/15/site/in
dex.aspx?sid=1250&gid=1&pgid=582&sparam=credo&scontid=0 (last visited Mar. 7, 2019).
324. CREIGHTON UNIV., STUDENT HANDBOOK (2016) (the “Credo of Creighton” is printed on
the inside cover or the handbook).
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Creighton” no longer sets forth a qualification on the principle of academic
freedom.
III. GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
Georgetown University, founded in 1789, is the nation’s oldest university operating under Catholic auspices. It’s current policy on academic freedom is set forth in the University’s Faculty Handbook. It provides:
Free inquiry and unconstrained publication of the results of inquiry are at the heart of a university. Our University commitment
to academic freedom supports all faculty (and professional librarians) in research, teaching, and professional service in and beyond
the University by protecting free inquiry and free expression.
Faculty enjoy academic freedom in the classroom, the laboratory,
the studio, the library, and all the domains of their academic activity. Academic freedom promotes intellectual honesty and requires respect for the academic rights of others.325
The Handbook goes on to say that academic freedom is further “reinforced by the institution of tenure.”326 The only mention of Georgetown’s
religious identity with respect to the rights and responsibilities of faculty
members is in a section titled “Religious Tolerance” which states that:
Faculty members have a responsibility to respect the religious beliefs and practices of all members of the Georgetown community,
and to recognize and respect that Georgetown University is a Jesuit university that is committed therefore to Catholic principles
and religious values. Faculty members are under no obligation to
conform with respect to their personal beliefs or religious
practices.327
What it means for a faculty member to “recognize and respect” that
Georgetown is a Jesuit university committed to Catholic principles and religious values is unclear. Given that Georgetown faculty have, in recent
years, been leaders in the movement for same-sex marriage,328 and advocates for legal protection for partial-birth abortion,329 “respect” would seem
to include the overt repudiation of these principles and values. Furthermore,
325. Faculty Handbook, pt. III.C.1, GEORGETOWN UNIV., https://facultyhandbook.georgetown
.edu/toc/section3 (last visited Mar. 7, 2019) [hereinafter Georgetown Handbook].
326. Id.
327. Id. pt. III.C.11.d.
328. This includes Chai Feldblum, a “long-time gay rights activist.” Chai R. Feldblum, WASH.
POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/chai-r-feldblum/gIQAywUjAP_print.html?noredi
rect=on.
329. Numerous current Georgetown law faculty have written or advocated in favor of the legal
protection of acts that the Catholic Church regards as gravely immoral, including abortion and
same-sex relations. See, e.g. Robin L. West, GEORGETOWN LAW, https://www.law.georgetown
.edu/faculty/robin-l-west/; David D. Cole, GEORGETOWN LAW, https://www.law.georgetown.edu/
faculty/david-d-cole/; Susan Deller Ross, GEORGETOWN LAW, https://www.law.georgetown.edu/
faculty/susan-deller-ross/
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that faculty “are under no obligation to conform with respect to their personal beliefs or religious practices” means that a Jesuit priest qua University faculty member may not be disciplined as a faculty member for acting
in a way that is contrary to the norms, practices, and beliefs of the Society
of Jesus.
In 1995–96, a number of Georgetown faculty and administrators
drawn from across University participated in a seminar on the nature and
future of Georgetown’s Jesuit and Catholic identity. The seminar produced
a document, Centered Pluralism: A Report of a Faculty Seminar on the
Jesuit and Catholic Identity of Georgetown University330 in which it addressed the subject of academic freedom in the context of a discussion of
Catholic identity. With understated candor, the report acknowledges that the
number of scholars “who are willing and qualified to conduct research informed by Catholic thought and concerns . . . are less represented on the
Georgetown faculty than they once were”331 and that this has weakened the
University intellectually. While foreswearing the need to alter the composition of the faculty “in any dramatic way”332 the document then offers a
number of modest ways to increase the Catholic intellectual presence at
Georgetown. But welcoming Catholic scholars “does not mean that Catholic ideas – or the people who advocate them – would be permitted to have a
limiting influence on scholarly inquiry and discourse.”333 The document
also describes academic freedom as “the foundation of academic life” and
makes plain that “Georgetown cannot tolerate any attempt to silence voices
arguing for controversial conclusions, including those that may be contrary
to those of the Roman Catholic Church. Only by open and free discussion

Nan Hunter, GEORGETOWN LAW, https://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/nan-hunter/; Naomi
Mezey, GEORGETOWN LAW, https://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/naomi-mezey/; Jill Morrison, GEORGETOWN LAW, https://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/jill-morrison/; Louis Michael
Seidman, GEORGETOWN LAW, https://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/louis-michael-seidman/;
Wendy Webster Williams, GEORGETOWN LAW, https://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/wendywebster-williams/. Perhaps most scandalous of all, the late Robert Drinan, a Jesuit priest and long
time Georgetown law professor, frequently spoke out in favor of abortion on demand, including
partial-birth abortion, a point conceded by friends and critics alike. See Raymond A. Schroth,
Hyphenated Priest: Robert Drinan’s Mixed Legacy, COMMONWEAL (April 19, 2010), available at
https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/hyphenated-priest; Peter Sprigg, Robert Drinan, Infanticide, and the “Unthinkable,” FIRST THINGS (April 30, 2007). Tragically, Drinan wrote two editorials in favor of the legal right to kill an unborn child through a technique generally known as
partial-birth abortion. See Robert F. Drinan, Posturing on Abortion, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 1996),
available at https://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/04/opinion/posturing-on-abortion.html; Robert F.
Drinan, Late-Term Abortion Veto Merits Analysis, NAT. CATH. RPTR. (May 31, 1996).
330. Bruce Douglass, Centered Pluralism: A Report of a Faculty Seminar on the Jesuit and
Catholic Identity of Georgetown University, reprinted in ENHANCING RELIGIOUS IDENTITY: BEST
PRACTICES FROM CATHOLIC CAMPUSES 69–90 (John Wilcox & Irene King eds., 2000).
331. Id. at 76, ¶ 30.
332. Id. ¶ 31.
333. Id. ¶ 32.

\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\15-2\UST201.txt

2019]

unknown

Seq: 67

11-APR-19

ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY

14:19

319

of the most contentious topics can this University perform its scholarly
function effectively.”334
In its “Policy on Speech and Expression,” Georgetown University cites
to its commitment to the “Catholic and Jesuit tradition” as the reason for its
commitment “to free and open inquiry, deliberation and debate in all matters, and the untrammeled verbal and nonverbal expression of ideas.”335
And so the University seeks to give faculty, students and staff “the broadest
possible latitude to speak, write, listen, challenge, and learn.”336 Although
members of the University community will often hold different, even contradictory views, “[d]eliberation or debate may not be suppressed because
the ideas put forth are thought by some or even by most members of the
University community to be offensive, unwise, immoral, or ill conceived.”337 Rather, the role of the University in such an instance is to function as a neutral arbiter “[f]ostering the ability of members of the University
community to engage with each other in an effective and responsible manner.”338 Although members of the community “are free to criticize and contest the views expressed by other members of the community, or by
individuals who are invited to campus, they may not obstruct or otherwise
interfere with the freedom of others to express views they reject or even
loathe,” and “the University has a solemn responsibility not only to promote
a lively and fearless freedom of deliberation and debate, but also to protect
that freedom when others attempt to restrict it.”339
IV.

UNIVERSITY

OF

NOTRE DAME

While similar to Georgetown’s, the University of Notre Dame’s
Faculty Handbook, is different in several important respects. It describes
academic freedom not simply as a right, but as a source of responsibilities,
and it situates the exercise of academic freedom within the context of a selfconsciously Christian university.
The Notre Dame Faculty Handbook declares that “[f]reedom of inquiry and freedom of expression are safeguarded by the University.”340 Although the “rights and obligations” [sic] of academic freedom take “diverse
forms” for faculty, students, and staff, Notre Dame says that “these freedoms derive from the nature of the academic life and accord with the objec334. Id. ¶ 33.
335. Georgetown Handbook, supra note 325, pt. IV.L. The robust nature of the policy and the
fact that it was recently adopted (June 8, 2017) appears to be Georgetown’s response to the recent
interference with the rights of speakers to speak and audiences to hear them that have taken place
on a number of college campuses (Middlebury, UC Berkeley, Claremont, etc.). Sadly, this interference has sometimes taken the form of physical assaults and other acts of violence.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. ACADEMIC ARTICLES, supra note 319, at 11, art. III, § 2.
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tives of the University as a community that pursues the highest scholarly
standards, promotes intellectual and spiritual growth, maintains respect for
individuals as persons, and lives in the tradition of Christian belief.”341
V.

BOSTON COLLEGE

Boston College’s policy on academic freedom appears in the Statutes
of the University. The policy provides:
All persons serving in instructional or research capacities,
whether faculty members or adjunct faculty, whether serving
under full-time or part-time appointments, are guaranteed the enjoyment of academic freedom. They have not only the right, but
also the duty, to participate fully in the search for and the communication of truth. It is the policy of Boston College to encourage
full freedom in teaching, discussion, research and publication and
to protect members of the faculty, whether tenured or non-tenured, against pressures and influences from within or from
outside the University which would restrict them in the exercise
of freedom.342
At the same time, Boston College insists that scholars must exercise this
freedom in a responsible fashion.
Academic freedom in no way lessens the responsibility of faculty
members to the strictest canons of scholarship and respect for
truth. In the classroom, a faculty member is entitled to freedom in
instruction, but should not persistently intrude material which has
no relation to his subject.
According to accepted standards of the academic profession,
while faculty members speaking or writing as citizens should be
free from institutional censorship or discipline, their special position in the community imposes special obligations. As scholars
and educational officers, they should be aware that the public may
judge their profession and their institution by their utterances.
Hence, they should at all times be accurate, exercise appropriate
restraint, show respect for the opinion of others, and make it clear
when they are not institutional spokesmen.343
The language of Boston College’s policy on academic freedom is generic to a fault. It could have been lifted from the policies of any number of
American universities. Moreover, the subsequent passage, reminding
faculty that the exercise of academic freedom calls for responsibility, does
not qualify the right in any meaningful sense. This is not a mother (alma
mater) telling her son to obey the curfew or forfeit use of the car. This is
341. Id.
342. The University Statutes, BOSTON COLLEGE, ch. II, § 5, pt. A, http://www.bc.edu/offices/
bylaws/statutes.html#ch2sec5 (last visited Mar. 7, 2019).
343. Id. ch. II, § 5, pt. B.
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instead a kind of avuncular advice—a friendly reminder borne from experience. The first reminder is that for the responsible exercise of academic
freedom, scholars should look inward, adhering to “the strictest canons of
scholarship and respect for truth.” The other “limitations” on the exercise of
academic freedom are likewise prudential. A teacher should “at all times be
accurate, exercise appropriate restraint, [and] show respect for the opinions
of others.” A teacher may indulge in commentary outside of his field of
competence, but “should not persistently intrude material which has no relation to his subject.”
VI. UNIVERSITY

OF

DAYTON

The University of Dayton’s policy on academic freedom is set forth in
the University’s Faculty Policy and Governance Handbook. It provides:
“All members of the faculty, whether tenured or not, are entitled to academic freedom as set forth in the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic
Freedom and Tenure, formulated by the Association of American Colleges
and the American Association of University Professors and endorsed by
over one hundred other academic organizations.”344
Elsewhere, the Faculty Handbook describes Dayton’s Catholic identity
in relation to academic freedom: “As a Catholic University, it accepts the
validity of revealed as well as of reasoned truth and is committed to genuine
and responsible academic freedom supported by proper respect for the
Church’s Magisterium.”345 The policy does not specify what this mandated
“proper respect” entails.

344. University of Dayton Faculty Policy and Governance Handbook, supra note 107, at 46.
345. Id. at 13.

